Essays on tax compliance by URPIS, ENRICO
Dottorato di ricerca in Economia
Ciclo XXIX
S.S.D: SECS-P/03
Essays on tax compliance
Coordinatore: Ch.mo Prof. Gianluca Femminis
Supervisor: Alessandro Santoro
Enrico Urpis
Matricola: 4212550
Anno Accademico 2015/2016

Co-Autorship Disclaimer
Chapter 1 is a joint work with Prof. Alessandro Santoro, DEMS, Universita`
degli studi di Milano-Bicocca.

Contents
Acknowledgement vii
Foreword viii
0.1 The low level of tax compliance in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
0.2 Estimates of tax compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
0.3 First chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
0.4 Second chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1 The Impact of Audits on Tax Compliance: Evidence from Italy 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Some theoretical considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Dynamic and non-utility-based models . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Definitions of base, audit, and after-audit years . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Types of audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Taxpayer characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Panel characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 The challenge of non-random audit data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
i
1.7 Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.7.1 Estimation of the propensity score . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.8 Discussion of the empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.9 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.9.1 Choosing matching algorithm and assessing matching qual-
ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.9.2 Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.9.3 Robustness using other matching approaches . . . . . . . 42
1.10 Concluding remarks and directions for future research . . . . . . 45
Appendix 1.A The use of true income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.A.1 The empirical approach with the use of the ”true” income 48
Appendix 1.B Complete results for the other matching approaches . . 52
2 A Minimum Tax in Italy: Impact on Revenues and Redistri-
bution 55
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.1 Implementation of a minimum tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.2 The equity-efficiency trade-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3.3 Taxpayers’ reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5.1 The database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5.2 Group 1 characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6.1 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6.2 Differences in the income corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ii
2.6.3 Differences in the correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.6.4 Effects of reactions to the minimum tax introduction . . . 86
2.6.5 A different representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.6.6 Trade-off between revenues and concentration . . . . . . . 99
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Appendix 2.A Groups classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix 2.B The two methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.B.1 General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.B.2 Presumptive statistical income estimation for Group G1B 108
2.B.3 Presumptive statistical income estimation for Group G1C 112
2.B.4 Italian Revenue Agency approach: Presumptive operative
income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.B.5 Istat methodology: Results for G1B . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
2.B.6 Istat methodology: Results for G1C . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.B.7 Istat methodology: Overall analysis of G1 and validation 124
2.B.8 RA presumptive operational income . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2.B.9 Comparison of methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Bibliography 135
iii

To Ching-Jung Chen
v

Acknowledgement
As always it is difficult to express the gratitude for all the persons who helped
or were closed to me in doing such a big work. The biggest risk is to forget
someone or to do not express the gratitude she deserves. For such reasons I
would like to thank in chronological order who helped me directly and, for the
one I forget to mention, please accept my apologies.
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Alessandro Santoro, who sup-
ported me in this process and constantly motivated me. He was really close
guiding my work and his support was remarkable.
I have to express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues who studied with me
in this process. Moreover, a special mention is deserved to Miss. Marina Bellani,
Mr. Andrea Gurgone, Mrs Ayshe Alp and Miss. Ivana Ribac who helped me
a lot in questioning my work and improving my exposition skills. I also need
to thank doctor Raffaele Riccardi, doctor Laura J. Allevi, Mr Salvo Grasso, Mr
Luca Zavarella and doctor Gianluca Di Fonzo their wise words helped me when
I was in need. I also have to mention my director, Mr. Antonino Lucido, who
supported me allowing a leave period that turned out to be really helpful.
As always, the parents and the family have to be acknowledge, thanks to
their support I never gave up.
I should also express my gratitudes to my colleagues and managers that
vii
helped me in various ways and support in difficult moments. The DEFAP staff
for being present and their prompt replies. Families Masini, Grasso and Di
Cioccio for hosting me when in need.
The final mention is for Miss Ching-Jung Chen, her support was decisive.
viii
Foreword
0.1 The low level of tax compliance in Italy
Fulfilling fiscal duties is a compulsory obligation that all citizens of modern
states are expected to pursue. By tax compliance we refer to the degree to
which taxpayers comply with their fiscal duties. It is then crucial to investigate
the extent to which taxpayers are loyal to the fiscal system. In fact, it is from
the taxes that services are financed and they are so important that economists
believe that civilization comes with taxation, as in Salanie (2002) .
However, not all fiscal duties are completely fulfilled by taxpayers. Every
year a variable amount of taxes are not declared. Apart from possible mistakes,
the reasons vary. They range from the act of not declaring marginal activities
intended to be consumed just by the taxpayer or their family, to the intentional
action of hiding the real taxable base. This intentional activity is performed in
order to pay less than the due amount. Since paying taxes is costly, there is a
consequent incentive to underreport them.
Taxes are essential for financing the services of states, so a decrease in re-
sources can have harmful consequences for public life. For this reason, there
has always been a need to understand why underreporting is happening, find
a possible method to estimate it and correct this by having taxpayers be more
compliant. A low level of compliance brings several issues. The first problem
ix
concerns the decrease in the amount of resources that are collected. It is possible
to see that a low level of compliance harms the government’s ability to finance
its activities, and so a low level of resources is associated with a low level of
services and goods provided by the state. A high level of tax evasion also causes
inequities and inefficiencies. One of the main tasks required of modern states
is to redistribute resources among their citizens, but when the resources are
hidden and not made available, this activity is compromised. Moreover, since
not all taxpayers have the possibility of dodging their taxes, tax evasion affects
the shares of the tax paid, meaning that some subjects pay a larger part of the
fiscal burden than they should pay.
Italy is characterised by a low level of tax compliance and different attempts
have been made to deal with this problem. These attempts have evolved over
time, provided by new developments in information technology but also by a
change in the approach to the problem. The instruments that have been dis-
placed have been influenced by the evolution that has occurred in the literature.
If in the past aim was stopping evasion from being profitable by setting an ap-
propriate level of audits and fines (as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972)), more
recent efforts have been devoted to increasing of tax compliance by promoting
a more collaborative relationship (see the Italian parliamentary hearing May
2016) between the Italian Revenue Agency and taxpayers, since it is believed
that taxpayers are not just driven by the desire to dodge their taxes if possible
(as in Alm et al. (1992)).
Moreover, a change in the approach was required, since Italy continues to be
characterized by a high level of tax evasion, as various estimations have pointed
out.
x
0.2 Estimates of tax compliance
There are several different ways to estimate the level of tax compliance. The
reason for the abundance of different methods in this field is the increasing
number of available sources over the years (for example, the digitalization of
information) and the possibility of analyzing this information using the latest
innovations in informatics.
Different methodologies have been proposed throughout the years, and dif-
ferent estimations have been calculated. Estimations can be based on direct or
indirect methodologies, can be pursued by public or private institutions, can
follow a top-down or bottom-up approach, can be focused on the economy as a
whole or just on particular sectors, etc.
Estimations of Italian tax evasion are provided by different institutes, but
among them, the latest report of the Ministry of Economy and Finance provides
a complete description of the problem of the low level of compliance in Italy.
Italy is still characterized by a high level of tax evasion. If the gap in all
taxes as a whole is considered as an approximation of tax evasion (since this gap
includes both intentional evasion and unintentional evasion, such as mistakes,
misinterpretation of laws, missed payments, etc.), evasion is quite high, since
this gap amounted to 23.6% in 2012 and 24.3% in 2013.
Moreover, there are differences among taxpayers. The same report points
out that taxpayers with revenues lower than e30,987 are characterized by a very
low level of tax compliance, since it is estimated that their rate of evasion is
51.56% higher than the average evasion rate.
Given such high levels of evasion, this work first investigates whether an
audit has any effect on tax compliance at all. Secondly, it studies whether the
implementation of a minimum tax can be a viable policy to solve the problem
of the high level of tax evasion.
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0.3 First chapter
The first chapter investigates the role of audits. Any tax system needs instru-
ments to enforce fiscal laws. The most common instrument that has been used
throughout the years is auditing the taxpayers. If a taxpayer is found not to be
compliant, a fine is commuted.
This scheme can be considered to be the most successful because it is the
most widespread. However, the effectiveness of audits has only recently been
investigated. In more detail, according to DeBacker et al. (2015b), two opposite
outcomes are possible, as taxpayers are influenced by two opposite effects: the
target effect and the bomb-crater effect.
Under the target effect, audits can lower the level of evasion, since audited
and fined taxpayers will change their expectations upward and declare more
taxes to avoid incurring further audits. However, this effect may last for only a
certain period of time, since, if no more audits take place, the expectation will
shift downward. In the end, after an audit, a taxpayer’s level of compliance will
immediately increase, but it will later decrease to the previous level.
The bomb-crater effect is the total opposite. Some taxpayers will believe that
they will be very unlikely to incur another audit immediately after a control.
Since these taxpayers do not believe that an immediately subsequent audit is
going to affect them, they will evade a great deal in the subsequent year(s) in
order to recover from having to pay the fine.
This first chapter uses a database provided by the Italian Revenue Agency
to shed some light on the behavior of Italian taxpayers. The focus is not just
on which of the two effects is prevailing but is also on the magnitude of the
effect and its extent in time. Using a combination of matching with difference-
in-difference techniques, this work shows how in a particular context, such as
Italy, audits can have a positive and lasting effect on tax compliance.
xii
0.4 Second chapter
The second chapter explores the possibility of solving the problem of high Italian
tax evasion by implementing a presumptive tax as a minimum tax. Presump-
tive taxes are used mostly, but not exclusively, in developing countries where
information on the tax base is too difficult to obtain or too unreliable.
Presumptive taxes have been studied extensively from a theoretical point of
view, and several authors have also provided descriptions of their implementa-
tions over time and in different countries. Presumptive taxes are investigated
in terms of their pros and cons and issues of fairness and efficiency.
The aim of the second chapter is to shed some light on the trade-offs as-
sociated with the implementation of a minimum tax. An increase in the total
amount of tax collected is associated with a decrease in differentiation across the
shares of paid taxes. In more detail, this study first investigates the potential
outcome of the implementation of a minimum tax without considering reactions
from taxpayers.
However, the implementation of a new policy might cause a change in tax-
payer behavior. Two different effects might take place: the leaving effect and
the leveling effect. For some taxpayers, presumptive taxes might be too high,
so they will decide to leave the market. Other taxpayers whose presumptive
taxes are lower than their declared taxes might consider it more convenient to
pay the presumptive tax and bear the risk of incurring an audit. Either of these
effects might change the outcome and significantly affect the implementation of
a minimum tax.
To investigate the implementation of the minimum tax and the effects of the
reactions, two different specifications of presumptive taxes are used. This choice
was made to provide more general results. Moreover, this work is focused on a
very specific group of taxpayers that various studies consider to be characterized
xiii
by a low level of tax compliance.
The aim of this work is to provide estimates of both the trade-off between
equity and efficiency associated with the implementation of a minimum tax and,
later, the effects of different levels of reactions on the outcome. Moreover, this
analysis is specifically carried out based on the same database adopted in the
first chapter and, thus, provides specific results for the Italian context. In the
end, this work shows the conditions for which the implementation of a minimum
tax would be convenient in a context like that of Italy.
xiv
Chapter 1
The Impact of Audits on
Tax Compliance: Evidence
from Italy
Santoro, A.; Urpis, E.
1.1 Introduction
In all developed countries, revenue agencies devote significant efforts and public
resources to auditing taxpayers’ reports and sanctioning taxpayers if they are
found guilty. Despite the magnitude of the administrative and compliance costs
created by these activities, the literature on the actual impact of audits has
developed only recently.
Andreoni et al. (1998) identify a conflict between experimental and econo-
metric results, which they discuss in Section 6.4 of their paper. Experimental
studies usually report that compliance increases significantly in later rounds of
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experiments among those participants who were audited in previous rounds.
On the contrary, audit studies, mainly based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
data, find no significant effect of prior audits on reporting behavior. The authors
offer two possible explanations for this lack of deterrence. First, audits in the
real world are not always fully efficient, that is, they may fail to uncover existing
noncompliance, so that taxpayers may conclude that it pays to cheat. Second,
alternatively, when taxpayers feel that an audit was a bad experience, they may
want to evade more in the future in an attempt to get back at the revenue
agency. This second explanation paves the way for a negative, and somewhat
counterintuitive, effect of audits on compliance. Significantly, Andreoni et al.
(1998) conclude this discussion by writing that “more research is needed both to
confirm whether there is any specific deterrent effect of an audit and to uncover
the reasons for the presence or the absence of such an effect.”
This gap has been filled by more recent literature only to a limited extent.
According to DeBacker et al. (2015b), two opposing expectations about the
aftereffects of tax audits have emerged.
The first, and perhaps more intuitive, expectation is that experiencing audits
leads taxpayers to revise their perceived audit probabilities upward and therefore
reduce their subsequent noncompliance. Afterward, for each year that they
do not experience audits, taxpayers revise their perceived audit probabilities
downward and, thus, increase their noncompliance. In that case, the post-
audit tax payment trend would consist of an immediate increase followed by a
decrease, which is called the target effect by (Hashimzade et al., 2014). This
effect is conjectured and verified, using data from a natural experiment, by
Kleven et al. (2011), who argue that, in the real world, experiencing an audit
leads to an increase in the perceived probability of being detected since taxpayers
are audited only if tax inspectors believe potential income can be uncovered.
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More recent contributions that find results consistent with a prevailing target
effect are Kleven et al. (2011), Advani et al. (2015), and DeBacker et al. (2015a).
All of these three studies use random audits.
Intriguingly, the second expectation is the complete opposite. Taxpayers
may, correctly or incorrectly, perceive that auditors rarely come back immedi-
ately after an audit and that it is safest to evade taxes right after an audit. As
years pass, the risk that auditors will come back increases, and, thus, it is best
to reduce noncompliance. In this case, the post-audit tax payment trend would
be an immediate decrease followed by an increase. This short-term negative
effect is related to the bomb-crater effect first identified by Guala and Mittone
(2005) and repeatedly found in more recent lab experiments. DeBacker et al.
(2015b), using data from real-world operational audits, find a similar pattern
for corporations using IRS and financial statement data. Corporations gradu-
ally increase their tax aggressiveness for a few years following an audit and then
reduce it sharply.
In this study, we contribute to this literature by focusing on the impact of
audits on tax compliance by individuals in Italy. Our database consists of a panel
of 528,540 VAT-registered taxpayers who earn income from self-employment
and/or from sole proprietorships. This panel represents the universe of VAT-
registered taxpayers who reside, for tax purposes, in three of the main regions
of Italy, Lombardy, Lazio, and Sicily, which are located in the north, center, and
south of Italy, respectively. The periods we observe include tax years 2007 and
2011, for a total of 2,642,700 observations. The panel is perfectly balanced, that
is, it includes exclusively taxpayers who issue their tax returns for all of the five
years. For the same tax years, we observe tax returns that are audited by the
Italian Revenue Agency. More precisely, we observe a total of 31,135 audited
tax declarations referring to tax years 2007 and 2008. Of these, 22,175 are single
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audits conducted on taxpayers audited only once over the periods observed.
We believe our research can be of general interest for two reasons.
First, we use results from the real world, that is, operational audits, whereas
the existing empirical literature uses random audits1. Although random audits
clearly do offer an empirical advantage by providing a clear counterfactual sce-
nario, we share the view of Slemrod (2016) that “the external validity of these
results is somewhat problematic. Because taxpayers audited under NRP are
informed that they have been randomly selected for research purposes, these
audits may not have the same impact on the perceived probability of a fu-
ture audit as an operational audit.” This argument applies to DeBacker et al.
(2015a) and to Advani et al. (2015), but not to Kleven et al. (2011). Another
critical argument put forward by Slemrod (2016) is that, since revenue agencies
do not select taxpayers randomly, taxpayers subject to random audits are not
representative of those who are typically subject to audits, and their behavior
may not be representative of that of taxpayers who are normally targeted for op-
erational audits. These issues imply serious limitations to drawing conclusions
about policy from the results based on random audits.
The second reason that this study is of general interest is that Italy differs
from countries for which the impacts of tax audits have already been tested (i.e.,
Denmark, the UK, and the US) because of its low tax morale and relatively
inefficient tax institutions. Both of these features may undermine the impact of
tax audits by lowering the perceived probability of being sanctioned and/or the
extended value of sanctions, which includes the social stigma arising from the
application of sanctions.
Even if a taxpayer knows she is being targeted by tax authorities, she still
may not increase her tax compliance if she believes that, in the future, she will
1The same database is used by Mazzolini et al. (2017), which is a companion study to this
one
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be able to find alternative ways to evade. Thus, an audit acts as a deterrent of
future evasion to the extent that the threat of an audit in the future is credible,
which, in turn, depends on the quality of enforcement institutions. Furthermore,
tax morale and social norms can play an important role. The main determinants
of tax morale are intrinsic motivations and perceptions of the fairness of the tax
system and the legitimacy of the state Luttmer and Singhal (2014). Thus,
even if a taxpayer does feel she is being targeted by authorities, she still may
not increase her tax compliance when no social stigma is attached to evasion
and/or if she feels justified in continuing to evade taxes raised by a state that
she perceives as unfair or illegitimate.
Clearly, operational non-random audits pose an identification threat, since
taxpayers selected for audit are likely to be different from those who are not
audited. Thus, a simple comparison between tax returns issued by audited and
non-audited taxpayers would be biased. We deal with this problem by using
an identification strategy based on the use of a difference-in-differences match-
ing estimator (see page 56 of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and the literature
cited therein), which combines propensity score matching with the difference-
in-differences technique. Furthermore, we exploit the richness of our database
by running some placebo tests.
Overall, our results indicate that compliance increases after audits, since
income reported by audited taxpayers increases with respect to that reported
by matched non-audited taxpayers. Moreover, in absolute terms, this increase
seems to respond mainly to the lag between the time when the audit is conducted
and the after-treatment tax year that is considered. More precisely, an audit
conducted during tax year t has a smaller but positive effect on tax returns
issued that year and referring to the previous year and a larger effect on tax
returns issued during year t + 1 and referring to tax year t. These results are
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obtained for different audit years and post-treatment years. However, the only
year in which an impact is expected but not found is tax year 2009, the year
when the Italian economy was most strongly hit by the economic recession. This
finding may indicate that, as expected, the impact of an audit depends also on
the economic context, and, particularly, on liquidity constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we suggest some theoretical
reasons to justify the possible roles played by tax morale and the (in)efficiency
of institutions. In Section 1.3, we describe some institutional features of the
Italian tax system. In Section 1.4, we provide a description of the database
along with some descriptive statistics. In Sections 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, we describe
our identification strategy, which we discuss critically in Section 1.8. Section 1.9
provides the result and is divided into two subsections. The first one includes a
test assessing the matching quality, and the second one estimates the treatment
effect and placebo regressions. Section 1.10 concludes.
1.2 Some theoretical considerations
In the context of the classical Allingham-Sandmo model (Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), A-S hereinafter) of tax evasion, the occurrence of an audit can enter the
process of updating beliefs.
Here, we assume that the model that applies to individuals can also be
applied to small businesses, since, in our dataset, these small businesses include
a significant amount of personal work and very limited amounts of external work
and capital. We shall show these metrics in 1.4.1.
Moreover, the data reasons for adapting the A-S model to large businesses
(see Shackelford et al. (2007)) do not apply in this case, as asymmetric infor-
mation due to the presence of an agent is absent. Usually, managers of large
businesses face a dilemma due to the presence of two different audiences, stake-
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holders and the IRS. By reporting truthfully, managers may increase the value
of their stocks, but, at the same time, they have to pay the required taxes. Al-
ternatively, managers may not report total revenues in order to pay fewer taxes,
but, in that case, they cause their stocks to depreciate.
In the context of small businesses, no such agency problems arise, so this
dilemma is absent. Thus, dealing with small businesses does not require sub-
stantial modification to the A-S model, contrary to the case of evasion by large
businesses.
Another difference is provided by Slemrod (2004), who specify that en-
trepreneurs and small businesses are characterized by a different risk approach
than large enterprises are. Small firms and entrepreneurs are risk averse, whereas
large companies are characterized by risk neutrality. The main reason is that
small businesses are focused on just one activity, implying a difference between
the cost of a dollar if caught and the benefit of a dollar gained by evading.
Moreover, large enterprises can invest significant resources in legally eluding
the tax norms. Such investments are prohibitive for small firms, which must
simply evade taxes if they want to reduce their tax rates.
According to the A-S model, if taxpayer i decides to evade taxes, her ex-
pected income is equal to
p[(1− τ)Y i − θτEi] + (1− p)[(1− τ)Y i + τEi] (1.1)
where p is the perceived probability of an audit, τ > 0 is the proportional tax
rate, and θ > 0 is the sanction rate. The taxpayer chooses Ei, the amount of true
income that is not reported (thus, Ei = Y i− Ŷ i, where Ŷ i is reported income).
The taxpayer decides to evade only if her expected income under evasion is
higher than that under no evasion, in which case she receives (1 − τ)Y i with
certainty. Then, it is immediate to see that if p < 1/(1 + θ), the taxpayer will
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evade her income completely, whereas, on the contrary, she will not evade if
p > 1/(1 + θ).
To allow for internal solutions (i.e., for optimal evasion between 0% and
100%) either risk aversion or a (convex) function of concealment costs can be
inserted into the model, but the roles of the two fundamental parameters of
deterrence, p and θ, are not altered.
Some simple extensions of the model clarify the roles of tax morale and of
the quality of institutions in this process of updating beliefs. We are interested
in analyzing these extensions since they provide support for the external validity
of our research on Italian taxpayers.
Looking at expression (1.1) it is clear that p should be interpreted as the
perceived probability that any evasion will be detected, which is not necessarily
equal to the probability of being audited. As stated by (Kleven et al., 2011), it
“is the product of the probability of being audited again and the probability of
undeclared income being uncovered conditional on audit.” Thus, we can write
p = pupa (1.2)
where pu is the probability of undeclared income being uncovered in the case
of an audit and pa is the probability of being audited again.
Now, in the original A-S model, the revenue agency is assumed to be 100%
efficient, so that pu = 1 and p can be interpreted as the probability of an
audit. However, this assumption is not realistic, since the revenue agency may
be unable to detect all tax evasion.
As stressed by (Kleven et al., 2011), if a taxpayer is audited, she may revise
her beliefs about pa upward. However, the final impact on the taxpayer’s deci-
sion depends on pu, which, in turn, depends on the perceived efficiency of the
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revenue agency2.
The available literature on the impact of tax audits on subsequent com-
pliance refers to countries where the quality of tax enforcement institutions is
generally deemed to be high (i.e., Denmark, the US, and the UK). A recent
survey by Oecd (2015) lists eight criteria to provide a high quality strategic
approach for managing taxpayers’ compliance. The tax administrations of Den-
mark and the UK satisfy all of them, and that of the US fails with respect to
only one of these criteria (see Oecd (2015), Table 3.9, p. 129). These outcomes
are consistent with the overall evaluation of government quality. Denmark ranks
first and the UK ninth according to the European Quality of Government Index
(EQI).
On the contrary, the Italian Tax Administration fails to satisfy at least five
of the eight criteria mentioned above (see Oecd (2015), Table 3.9, p. 129) and,
in particular, the debt collection function is inefficiently administered (Oecd
(2016)). The inefficiency of the Italian tax administration relative to other
OECD countries is just one aspect of the problem of low government quality, as
Italy ranks only 24th among the 31 countries listed in the EQI ranking, although
northern regions perform better than central and southern ones.
In sum, on an a priori basis, one could expect Italian taxpayers to perceive
a low probability that evasion is detected, which means that pu is low, under-
mining the possible increase of pa generated by an audit.3
A very similar reasoning applies to the analysis of sanctions. The expected
utility framework of the A-S model has been enriched by also including the
role of social sanctions, such as the stigma attached to detected evasion, in the
2NEW PART point 2: This is the target effect that we shall illustrate in 1.2.1.
3Clearly, if the outcome of the audit, that is, the actual amount of evasion that is legally
assessed, were fully observable, we could distinguish between cases where pu is also updated
and cases where it is not. For example, Mazzolini et al. (2017) distinguish between audits with
a null outcome and audits where the taxpayer accepts, implicitly or explicitly, the assessment
by the revenue agency, but they cannot observe the final outcomes of audits followed by a
legal suit.
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model. According to this view, the parameter θ depends on both the level of
legal sanctions, θL, and that of social sanctions, θS , as follows
θ = f(θL, θS) (1.3)
with f strictly increasing in both arguments.
On the one hand, the effective value of θL varies across different countries
because of heterogeneities within tax codes and also because of the frequency
and magnitude of tax amnesties. In Italy, there has been a tax amnesty, in
some form, every two years, on average, for the past twenty years. Thus, the
expected value of θL is very low in Italy as compared to that in other countries.
On the other hand, countries for which evidence of the impact of audits is
available can be assumed to have quite high values of θS .
The US ranks first and Denmark fourth in the ranking of tax morale provided
by Alm and Torgler (2006) using the World Value Survey (see Alm and Torgler
(2006), Figure 2, p. 239). On the contrary, although Italy has a medium
tax morale rank (7th) on average according to Alm and Torgler (2006), it is
generally believed that in some parts of the country, especially in the central
and southern regions, tax morale is very low (Cannari and D’Alessio (2007)).
This heterogeneity traces back to Italian history. As stressed by Alm and Torgler
(2006), low tax morale can be explained by the historical conflicting relationship
between secular and religious authorities that characterizes the center and south
of Italy. Low tax morale is generally associated with limited social sanctions
and stigma associated with tax evasion. The tax evader, in Italy, is seen as a
smart person rather than as a law breaker or a criminal.
Thus, in Italy, both the values of θL and of θS are lower than those in
many other developed countries, and the condition ensuring no evasion (i.e.,
p > 1/(1 + θ)) is less likely to be satisfied for any given p.
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To sum up, there are reasons to expect that the impact of audits on a country
such as Italy is different from that on countries such as the US, Denmark, and
the UK.
1.2.1 Dynamic and non-utility-based models
The A-S model also presents an analysis of taxpayers’ behavior in a dynamic
context. If different periods of time are included in the analysis, the model con-
jectures that taxpayers will exhibit two opposite behaviors. Myopic individuals
will not consider the effects of their actions in a multi-period context and will
therefore simply behave as if every period of time is independent from the oth-
ers. On the contrary, consistent subjects maximize their lifetime utilities and are
aware of the fact that cheating in one period affects their positions in subsequent
periods. More precisely, if each taxpayer found cheating is also investigated in
all years prior to his last full payment, only the consistent individuals will use
this information. In this setting, the authors illustrate that some taxpayers may
be honest and some may dodge taxes given individual characteristics, as myopic
individuals declare fewer taxes than consistent individuals.
The dynamic setting of the A-S model incorporates discrete time and an
infinite life expectancy. In fact, consistent individuals are aware of the effect
that cheating has in the current year, and, for this reason, their present decisions
are influenced by their past decisions. This cohort of taxpayers is aware that an
audit in the present day will bring controls for previously underreported income,
so income not reported today will also influence the decision to report truthfully
tomorrow.
The A-S dynamic context thus provides insight into the possible reasons
for some taxpayers declaring more than would be expected in a single period
setting. As consistent taxpayers are aware of the impact of their decisions in
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time, they tend to comply more than myopic ones do. Thus, in this context, it
is shortsighted to evade taxes.
However, Alm et al. (1992) find that taxpayers may not behave as profit
maximizers. Alm et al. (1992) focus on tax morale by reproducing in a lab
experiment the choices that individuals face in their real lives. The authors
find that experimental subjects are driven by a multitude of forces, such as the
over- or underestimation of the probability of being detected. Moreover, they
also find that when the probability of being discovered cheating approaches
zero, some subjects are still willing to participate in the tax system and declare
thoughtfully.
Since the choice faced by the taxpayer is not strictly individualistic, Alm
(2012) consider the network effects of the influence of other people on the be-
havior of taxpayers to further investigate this assumption. In the end, they
show that if taxpayers suspect that the individuals that they observe cheat,
these taxpayers will adapt and report fewer taxes. This phenomenon is called
the peer effect to emphasize the role that one close person has on another.
The impact of the occurrence of an audit has become the central object of
interest in behavioral models. It has been reported that the behavior of an
individual can change when that individual is audited. Among other studies,
Hashimzade et al. (2014) demonstrate that the effect of an audit on the following
year’s behavior is difficult to predict since two mechanisms are at work: the
target effect and the bomb-crater effect. In their model, the target effect is
personal to each taxpayer and is positively related to the control. If a person is
audited, the target effect increases his compliance in the following years, since he
has the experience of being targeted by the tax authority. At the same time, the
bomb-crater effect means that being audited decreases the level of compliance,
since the taxpayer believes that the chance of being audited two years in a row
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is negligible. For this reason, the authors show that, at least in the short term,
it is difficult to predict the effect of an audit, since these two effects work at the
same time but in opposite directions.
More specifically, the bomb-crater effect is the focus of Guala and Mittone
(2005) and Kastlunger et al. (2009). These authors explain this particular be-
havior by considering two possible reasons. First, some subjects tend to evade
more immediately after being audited because of the loss repair effect, since
an audited taxpayer might try to restore his losses by engaging in tax evasion
in subsequent filings, as in Maciejovsky et al. (2007). The second reason is a
misspecification of chances, as described in Maciejovsky et al. (2007) and in
Kastlunger et al. (2009). The behavior of taxpayers may be similar to that of
soldiers in the First World War. Taxpayers believe that it is improbable that
they will to be audited again after being audited. Moreover, Mittone (2006)
investigates the long-term effect of audits and finds that in experiments, the
bomb-crater effect weakens after 30 rounds.
Since the analysis of dynamic models shows that either the bomb-crater ef-
fect or the target effect arises depending on certain conditions, it is interesting
to analyze the response to an audit in a context like Italy, where the level of
tax compliance is low. Previous studies have analyzed the responses to audits
of taxpayers characterized by a high level of compliance, so comparing the re-
sponses of taxpayers with a lower level of compliance can show similarities or
differences in behavior. This comparison can help to provide suggestions for
better policies, which can be tailored to the environment and the characteristics
of the taxpayers.
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1.3 Institutional background
In Italy, individual taxpayers earning income from self-employment and/or from
sole proprietorships are required to register for value-added tax (VAT) purposes.
Both of these incomes are basically self-reported and are not subject to third-
party information4. Tax returns are based on accounting books, but for many
small economic activities, a simplified accounting regime is adopted5, so that
only some of the transactions relevant for tax purposes are recorded. Thus, a
tax return can diverge from the accounting books to some extent if a simplified
accounting regime is adopted. We shall refer to this possibility as ex-post tax
adjustment.
The lack of third-party information implies that tax audits are a particularly
important tool for reducing the evasion of taxes on these incomes.
In Italy, audits are the most important kind of tax verification activity con-
ducted by Agenzia delle Entrate (AE), although some specific verification ac-
tivities are carried out by Guardia di Finanza (a separate tax police body).
Of AE’s entire workforce of approximately 30,000 units, 12,000 are involved
in audit activities. The whole auditing process consists of five different steps:
i) mapping and planning; ii) risk assessment; iii) selection of taxpayers to be
audited; iv) audits and assessment; and v) settlement or trial (in the case of
a positive assessment). Steps i)-iv) are administered by central, regional, and
provincial directorates.
More specifically, the central directorate (Direzione centrale dell’accertamento)
is entirely in charge of step i), which is accomplished by setting specific targets
in terms of the number and type of taxpayers (large, medium, and small com-
panies and self-employed individuals) to be audited each year. Then, whereas
4Some types of income obtained by professionals working with firms are subject to a with-
holding tax.
5Under given thresholds, the simplified accounting regime is the default option, but the
ordinary accounting regime option can be chosen by the taxpayer if she is willing to do so.
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audits on large taxpayers are administered mostly at the central level, audits
on medium (approximately 60,000 taxpayers) and small businesses and self-
employed individuals (approximately 4 million taxpayers) are administered by
regional and provincial directorates, respectively, in collaboration with the cen-
tral directorate. This collaboration is particularly important within step ii) (risk
assessment).
An important source of information for AE is provided by Business Sector
Studies (Studi di Settore (SDS), see Santoro and Fiorio (2011)). For each tax-
payer subject to an SDS, a presumptive turnover is computed by multiplying
input values, as reported by the taxpayer, by input productivities, as computed
by AE.
Taxpayers are classified as congruous or non-congruous if their reported
turnovers are higher or lower, respectively, than the presumptive turnover. Tax-
payers know their presumptive turnovers, and they know that they are more
likely to be audited if they are non-congruous. However, congruous taxpayers
can also be audited, and, conversely, the vast majority of non-congruous taxpay-
ers are not audited. The whole range of these activities generates different lists
of potential targeted taxpayers that are then transmitted to local directorates.
However, both regional and provincial directorates possess a remarkable de-
gree of autonomy in the selection of the taxpayers to be audited (step iii). On
the one hand, they can conduct their own risk assessments, based on infor-
mation collected on the spot, and identify risky taxpayers not selected at the
central level; these assessments are particularly important for the Italian econ-
omy, which is characterized by a number of locally specialized districts. On the
other hand, since local directorates are in charge of the achievements of their
targets, they can at least partly ignore the taxpayers included in the list pro-
vided by the central directorate. Although information on the identities of the
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taxpayers who are actually audited is not publicly available, the nature of this
process is such that it is reasonable to presume that the main selection crite-
ria are the geographical location, sector, size, and legal type of the economic
activity (see also Section 1.7.1)
1.3.1 Definitions of base, audit, and after-audit years
In Italy, individual taxpayers are required to pay taxes on all personal income
earned in a given tax year. The tax year usually begins on the 1st of January
and ends on the 31st of December. Incomes earned in a given tax year have to
be reported between May and September of the following calendar year. Thus,
incomes earned between January 1st and December 31st of year t have to be
reported between May and September of year t+ 1.
Once a tax report has been issued, it can be audited. However, audits are
subject to an expiration deadline. In Italy, a tax report referring to year t must
be audited by the 31st of December of year t + 5. After this time, evasion can
be prosecuted only if it is associated with some other crime.
In this study, we should define the base year as the tax year in which the
return is filed. In contrast, the audit year is the year in which the audit occurs.
However, these definitions do not overlap exactly with the calendar year. Ac-
cording to the AE definition, a “year t” audit is an audit carried out between
July 1st of year t− 1 and June 30th of year t.
Because of the expiration deadline mentioned above, tax returns that refer
to base year 2007 can be audited in audit years between 2009 and 2013, whereas
tax returns that refer to base year 2008 can be audited in audit years between
2010 and 2014.
Finally, we define as an after-audit year a tax year whose tax return can be
influenced by an audit. In general, if an audit is conducted during year t, its
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impact, if any, should be fully captured in tax returns that refer to year t, but
it is possible that an audit can have some effects on tax returns that refer to
previous years, namely, year t− 2 and, in particular, year t− 1.
To illustrate this possibility, Figure 1 provides a useful example where an
audit is conducted in audit year t and tax returns that refer to tax years t− 2
and t− 1 are affected.
 
 
 
Jul   t-1                                                                                                        Jul t 
Mayt  t  Sept  t 
Tax year (t-1)  return issued 
Audit year t 
Jan  t-1 Dec  t-1 Jan  t Dec  t 
Tax year (t-1) Tax year t 
Tax year (t-2) return issued  
May
t-1
  Sept t-1 
Figure 1.1: Time framework of tax returns and of audits
The first tax return we consider is that for year t − 2. This return may be
influenced by the audit if the audit is conducted between July and September
of year t and only if the tax return was issued between May and June of the
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same year. Even in that case, however, year t− 2 is surely over when the audit
is conducted, so the impact of the audit can only be reflected in ex-post tax
adjustments. Overall, the possibility that an audit conducted in audit year t
influences the tax return for base year t − 2 is very unlikely, but it cannot be
ignored on a priori grounds. No effect should be observed for the tax returns
for years before t− 2.
A tax return for year t− 1 is more likely to be influenced by a year t audit.
Unless the audit is conducted in June or July of year t and the tax return
is issued in May of the same year, the tax return is issued after the audit is
conducted. Moreover, if the audit is conducted between July and December of
year t− 1, accounting books have still to be completed. However, if the audit is
conducted between January and July of year t, accounting books are completed,
so the impact of an audit is reflected only by ex-post tax return adjustments.
Since the audit year extends from the 1st of July of year t − 1 to the 30th
of June of year t, if a return is audited on July 1, 2009, it means that the
control is taking place in audit year 2010. Moreover, the taxpayer still has until
September 30, 2009 to file a return for the year 2008. For this reason, it is
possible that an audit in audit year 2010 can influence the return for 2008.
Because of these differences among calendar, report, audit, and post-audit
years, the database includes the effects of audits occurring from 2011 to 2013.
Finally, from the tax return referring to tax year t onwards, the effects of
the audit, if any, should be fully observable. Thus, to sum up, for every audit
(treatment) conducted in year t, we can distinguish three sets of years:
• years from t onwards, which are after-audit years for which the effect of
the audit (if any) should be fully observable;
• year t− 1, which is an after-audit year for which the effect of the audit (if
any) should be partially observable (i.e., only observable for ex-post tax
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return adjustments);
• years t−n for n > 2, which are pre-audit years for which the effect of the
audit is dubious.
1.3.2 Types of audits
We define as single an audit conducted in a given year that inspects only one
tax return issued by a given taxpayer. For a single audit, there is one audit
year and one base year. We define as multiple an audit conducted in a given
year that inspects more than one tax return issued by a given taxpayer. In
particular, an audit conducted in January of year t could inspect tax returns
referring to the base years from t− 5 to t− 2, inclusive.
On the other hand, using a panel, we can observe a taxpayer audited only
once (with a single or multiple audit) or a taxpayer audited repeatedly (again,
with single or multiple audits).
The distinction between these different types of audits is relevant for the
purpose of identifying an audit’s effects. Although, as we shall explain below,
we are quite confident that we can identify some of the determinants of the
probability of conducting a standard, single audit, the information used by the
Revenue Agency to decide when to opt for a multiple audit or to audit a taxpayer
more than once is not available to us.
1.4 Data description
Our database consists of a panel of 528,540 VAT-registered taxpayers. A VAT-
registered individual taxpayer is a taxpayer who runs an economic activity on his
own, as self-employed or as a single entrepreneur. Thus, his sales and purchases
are, in principle, subject to the VAT.
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1.4.1 Taxpayer characteristics
The taxpayers included in the analysis perform different kinds of activities. Most
of them are active in services or commerce. As Table 1 shows, less than one
tenth of these taxpayers are involved in agriculture and industry. Considering
both 2007 and 2008, we observe only a few migrations across different sectors,
so the choice of activity can be considered stable.
Table 1.1: Economic sectors of the taxpayers included in the database
2007 2008
Economic sector n. % n. %
Agriculture 37,370 7.07% 37,313 7.06%
Services 256,366 48.50% 256,477 48.53%
Commerce 134,370 25.42% 134,357 25.42%
Construction 66,892 12.66% 66,876 12.65%
Industry 33,542 6.35% 33,517 6.34%
Tot 528,540 100.00% 528,540 100.00%
We now present the features that justify the use of the A-S model. The
taxpayers in the sample are running businesses for which the most important
input is the workforce of the owner. The use of other’s people work is marginal,
and the same is true for the use of capital goods.
Three quarters of the individuals included in the database do not hire any
workers at all. The remaining quarter typically hires fewer than ten workers
in the observed years. The limited fraction of taxpayers hiring ten or more
individuals hires an average of approximately fifteen workers in both years.
Table 2 illustrates that this pool of taxpayers uses an extremely limited amount
of the external workforce and that the entrepreneurs are actually involved in
production.
Another characteristic of the sample is the limited amount of capital equip-
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Table 1.2: Number of hired workers per activity
2007 2008
N. workers n. % n. %
0 398,029 75.31% 390,655 73.91 %
1 55,499 10.50% 57,955 10.97 %
2 27,748 5.25% 29,403 5.56 %
3 15,594 2.95% 16,711 3.16 %
4 9,386 1.78% 10,128 1.92 %
5 6,080 1.15% 6,482 1.23 %
6 4,097 0.78% 4,372 0.83 %
7 2,860 0.54% 3,016 0.57 %
8 2,024 0.38% 2,150 0.41 %
9 1,544 0.29% 1,653 0.31 %
10 + 5,679 1.07% 6,015 1.14 %
Tot 528,540 100.00% 528,540 100.00 %
ment used in production. Around 44,000 individuals did not declare any capital
goods in 2007, and 43,000 did not declare any in 2008. Moreover, all of the
taxpayers in the industry sector declared no capital equipment in both years.
To measure the share of capital equipment in the remaining activities, we
calculate the ratio of capital goods to revenues in each year. This ratio is lower
than 10% in 2007, but it is much higher in 2008. 1.3 shows that the value
of capital goods did not change much between the two years, so most of this
change is due to the decrease in revenues starting in 2008, the beginning of the
economic crisis.
The combination of the small workforce hired and the low level of capital
goods leave no doubt about the true nature of the activities that are included in
this database. The database includes only small entrepreneurs who rely almost
solely on their workforce, with considerably limited investment in capital goods.
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Table 1.3: Average capital invested and ratio capital invested by revenues
2007 2008
Economic sector Capital Capital/Revenues Capital Capital/Revenues
Agriculture 48,240 0.30% 52,529 0.51%
Services 33,470 9.97% 31,354 43.69%
Commerce 36,770 3.85% 37,438 49.51%
Construction 37,442 3.85% 37,454 32.77%
Industry 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Tot 38,802 8.24% 38,132 30.36%
The table includes data from activities that declared positive values of
capital equipment and revenues.
1.4.2 Panel characteristics
This panel represents the universe of VAT-registered taxpayers who reside for
tax purposes in three of the main regions of Italy, Lombardy, Lazio, and Sicily,
located in the north, center, and south of Italy, respectively. The periods we
observe include tax years 2007 and 2011, for a total of 2,642,700 observations.
The panel is perfectly balanced, that is, it includes exclusively taxpayers who
issue their tax returns for all of the five years 6.
For each observation (a taxpayer in a given year) we have the following
information:
• gender, age, municipality, province and region of residence, economic sec-
tor of operation and taxable income type (from self-employment and/or
from sole proprietorship);
6The lack of any attrition may, at first sight, be seen as a limitation of our dataset, since it
prevents us from evaluating the impact on new economic activities and on taxpayers’ decisions
to interrupt their activities. However, the latter would be empirically difficult to evaluate due
to the possibility that the after-audit effect depends on the economic conditions of the business
and not on the audit itself. It is noteworthy that DeBacker et al. (2015b) exclude new and
ceased corporations from their analysis of the impact of tax audits
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• revenues, costs, reported income, tax base, gross tax, and net tax;
• presumptive turnover as calculated by the Italian Revenue Agency (SDS)
(for approximately 80% of the panel) and the presence of dependent work-
ers;
• whether the tax declaration was assisted by a tax consultant, distinguished
between three types: no consultancy, consultancy with limited responsi-
bility, and consultancy with full responsibility. By limited responsibility,
we mean that the tax consultant is responsible only for the correct and on-
time presentation of the tax declaration. By full responsibility, we mean
that the tax consultant assumes formal responsibility for the correctness
of the content of the tax return and is presumably paid an additional fee
for bearing this responsibility. Note that, in both of these cases, the tax
consultant may have provided some “avoidance services” to the taxpayer.
As we argue in Section 1.7, matching requires selecting variables that simul-
taneously affect the selection process and the outcome variable. For reasons
to be described in Section 1.7, we choose the variables listed and described in
Table 1.4
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Table 1.4: Description of variables
Type of variable Notation Description
Taxable income y Outcome variable
Gender Dmale =1 if male
Age age age (in 2007)
Region DRegion =1 if resident in
Sicily, Lazio, or
Lombardy
Sector DNP =1 if not a primary
sector (not indus-
trial or agricultural)
Marginal tax rate Mrate IRPEF marginal
tax rate (between
23% and 43%)
Dep.workers Ddw =1 if at least one
dependent worker
Consultancy consul =0 if no consul-
tancy, =1 if limited
respons., = if full
respons.
Our database contains also information on the occurrence of tax audits con-
ducted on tax returns referring to either base year 2007 or base year 2008. In
our dataset, we observe a total of 31,135 audited tax declarations referring to
base years 2007 and 2008. Of these, 20,140 are single audits as defined above,
and their distributions among audit years and base years are described in Table
1.57.
The percentage of single audits ranges from 0.1% to 1.3%. For both base
years, it is quite evident that audits are concentrated in audit years that are
closer to the expiration deadline (i.e., in audit year 2012 for base year 2007 and
in audit year 2013 for base year 2008). Overall, single audits amount to 2.3%
and 1.7% of total tax returns issued for the years 2007 and 2008, respectively
(excluding in both cases those returns involved in multiple or repeated audits).
7Observations of multiple audits as well as those of repeated audits on the same taxpayer
are not reported.
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Table 1.5: Distribution of single audits
Audit year Base year Single audits (num-
ber)
Single audits (%
of audited+non-
audited
2009 2007 452 0.09
2010 2007 1,052 0.209
2010 2008 175 0.03
2011 2007 2,290 0.43
2011 2008 877 0.17
2012 2007 5,139 0.97
2012 2008 3,198 0.61
2013 2008 5,601 1.06
These percentages are in line with the international evidence on the probability
of audit. For example, in the U.S., the IRS audits approximately 1% of returns
issued by self-employed individuals and sole proprietorships.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report the average values for the outcome variable, taxable
income (y), and other variables that are described in Table 1.4.
Table 1.6: Descriptions of the outcome variable and covariates, base year 2007
AY2009 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 46418.41 0.81 47.26 0.37 0.17 0 .86 0.31 0.39 0.96
All 33915.62 0.77 46.02 0.21 0.25 0 .86 0.30 0.24 0.97
AY2010 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 30437.72 0.79 46.84 0.40 0.26 0 .89 0.28 0.42 0.98
All 33890.96 0.77 46.02 0.21 0.25 0 .86 0.30 0.24 0.97
AY2011 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 34295.45 0.78 47.14 0.36 0.25 0 .90 0.28 0.24 0.97
All 33903.59 0.77 46.03 0.21 0.25 0 .86 0.30 0.41 0.98
AY2012 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 43980.55 0.80 47.55 0.27 0.30 0 .89 0.31 0.24 0.97
All 34033.33 0.77 46.04 0.21 0.26 0 .86 0.30 0.33 0.97
We make two observations.
First, the differences in the outcome variable, taxable income, are hetero-
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Table 1.7: Descriptions of the outcome variable and covariates, base year 2008
AY2010 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 33927.86 0.84 47.63 0.32 0.22 0.89 0.29 0.40 0.98
All 34156.61 0.77 46.02 0.21 0.25 0 .86 0.30 0.26 0.97
AY2011 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 31970.25 0.84 46.15 0.23 0.25 0 .91 0.28 0.41 0.98
All 34139.89 0.77 46.02 0.21 0.25 0 ¿ .86 0.30 0.25 0.97
AY2012 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 36377.50 0.81 47.29 0.25 0.22 0 ¿ .90 0.30 0.40 0.97
All 34063.91 0.77 46.01 0.20 0.25 0 ¿ .86 0.30 0.25 0.97
AY2013 y Dmale age DSIC DLAZ DNP mrate Ddw consul
Audited 51130.56 0.79 47.93 0.30 0.33 0 .91 0.32 0.39 0.97
All 34342.74 0.77 46.04 0.21 0.26 0 ¿ .87 0.30 0.26 0.97
geneous across audit years. In some audit years, for example, 2013 and 2012,
taxable income as reported by audited taxpayers is higher than that reported
by non-audited taxpayers. Since these are the years in which the majority of
audits are concentrated, this evidence goes against the idea that the revenue
agency focuses on taxpayers reporting lower incomes.
Second, the differences in some covariates, namely the region and the pres-
ence of dependent workers, are also quite remarkable before matching, thus
stressing the need to carefully assess the quality of the matching procedure.
1.5 The challenge of non-random audit data
Audits are usually selected according to two opposite selection rules. Audits can
be based on an exogenous (or random) selection rule or on an endogenous se-
lection rule in which specific taxpayer characteristics reported on the taxpayer’s
submitted return form the basis for audit selection. Usually, both selection
rules are implemented in the same time period. However, the presence of such
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an endogenous audit selection rule means, of course, that the likelihood of au-
dit selection is an endogenous variable, and this potential endogeneity must be
considered in the empirical estimation.
By way of explanation, the audit data used in this study are based on “op-
erational audits” of tax returns selected in a non-random way. Specifically, the
audits are determined on the basis of information contained in the tax returns,
as opposed to audits that are based on randomly selected tax returns.
Since our audits are non-random, we choose a methodology that does not re-
quire randomness. This methodology is summarized by Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008), who propose a combination of matching and differences in differences
(DiD) estimators. Treated subjects are first matched with ex ante similar (be-
fore the treatment) non-treated subjects. Different matching options can be
implemented (radius, nearest neighborhood, stratification, kernel, etc.), and all
of them have pros and cons. It is important that in the end there are con-
gruous numbers of treated and untreated matched individuals to investigate
the average effect of the treatment on the treated. To deal with the problem
of non-random audits, we must implement a procedure that aims to measure
the difference between the level of evasion if an audit does or does not occur.
However, precisely measuring this difference is impossible because a taxpayer
is either audited or unaudited and because we do not observe the true income.
To overcome this problem, we use a vector of observables (under the assump-
tion of unconfoundedness) to match audited and unaudited taxpayers before the
audit occurs. Then, we deal with the unobservability of the true incomes by
assuming that, on average, the difference between the true incomes of audited
and unaudited taxpayers is the same after the audit. In this way, the difference
between the true and the reported incomes of unaudited and audited taxpayers
after the audit will be equal, on average, to the difference between the reported
27
incomes. Thus, it will then be possible to estimate the difference between the
difference in the true and reported incomes of the unaudited taxpayers and the
same difference for the audited taxpayers.
This methodology overcomes the problem that one subject can either be
treated or non-treated. To effectively estimate the effect of a treatment, ideally
both treatment and non-treatment outcomes would be observed for the same
subject. Since doing so is clearly not possible, the methodology used in this
study first identifies the most similar individuals in the treatment and non-
treatment groups and then estimates the net effect of the treatment.
To effectively implement this methodology, it is necessary to have a large
group of non-participant individuals who are similar to the participant individ-
uals for some characteristics. These similar characteristics are crucial since they
are going to be used to match the two different cohorts of individuals. Moreover,
when determining the correct variables to use for matching, they should not be
too good. To effectively work, there should be some randomness in the data,
that is, some subjects should be able to receive the treatment or not so that at
least two individuals with identical characteristics may exist in both states.
Provided that pool of individuals included in the database is appropriate
considering the latest observations of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the analysis
in this study allows for the investigation of the effect of an audit. The size of
the database allows for a congruous number of matches that provides the basis
for a rigorous analysis.
An alternative approach is used in another study (Mazzolini et al. (2017))
that is part of the same research project and that uses the same data used here.
This alternative approach is a panel approach where difference-in-differences
estimation is combined with fixed effects, allowing the authors to control for
unobservable time-invariant characteristics of audited taxpayers that may have
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caused the Revenue Agency to select them for the audit. On the contrary, in
this analysis, we use a year-by-year matching procedure where the matching
algorithm includes both time-invariant (gender, sector, and region) and time-
variant (age, marginal tax rate, presence of dependent workers, and type of
consultancy) characteristics.
In the companion study (Mazzolini et al. (2017)), a semiparametric ex-ante
approach restricts the control sample using the nearest-neighbor matching al-
gorithm of Abadie et al. (2004). This empirical strategy enables the authors to
address endogeneity related to time-invariant factors influencing the treatment
assignment. Specifically, they find a net tax-revenue effect of audits that ranges
from three thousand euro (unweighted average) to around eight thousand euro
(when weighted by audit outcome).
It is possible to anticipate the result of Mazzolini et al. (2017) in Table 8,
which reports the positive effect of audits on the audited years.
1.6 Identification strategy
Our intention is to estimate the impact of an audit conducted at time t on
a taxpayer’s choice to evade taxes at time t + s, s = 1, .., n. We denote the
occurrence of an audit (treatment) as at = 1, the absence of an audit (no
treatment) as at = 0, true income as Y TA, and reported income by the audited
taxpayer as Y RA. Ideally, for every audited taxpayer, we would like to measure
[(Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s )|a0 = 0]− [(Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s )|a0 = 1] (1.4)
where [(Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s )|a0 = 1] is the evasion actually chosen by the audited
taxpayer and [(Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s )|a0 = 0] is the evasion that the audited taxpayer
would have chosen at time t + s if she had not been audited at time t. The
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Table 1.8: Average Audit Effect; Mazzolini et al. (2017)
OLS Fixed Effects
w/o control with controls w/o control with controls
Audit effect 4,789.22 7,591.91 3,079.46 3,471.90
[580.166] [556.275] [372.334] [371.373]
Constant 37,401.05 -49,561.44 37,401.28 -44,486.05
[117.195] [1,265.478] [53.583] [2,502.199]
Ind. controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Individual FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,352,860 2,352,860 2,352,860 2,352,860
R-squared 0.003 0.066 0.013 0.017
Number of id 470,572 470,572
Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 4 report fixed-effect
estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
taxpayer level. Individual controls are gender, age, and age squared.
average treatment effect on the treated would thus be equal to the mean of
(1.4) calculated over all audited taxpayers.
However, equation (1.4) cannot be estimated because
1. a taxpayer in a given year is either audited or unaudited, so that [(Y TAt+s −
Y RAt+s )|a0 = 1] cannot be observed and
2. true income cannot be observed.
To address issue 1, we denote by Y TUt+s and Y
RU
t+s true and reported income,
respectively, at time t+ s for a taxpayer who is not audited (U) at time t. We
assume that there exists a function g(X), where X is a vector of observables,
such that
[((Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s )|a0 = 0) = Y TUt+s − Y RUt+s ]|g(XAt ) = g(XUt ) (1.5)
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This is the assumption of unconfoundedness; conditional upon having the
same g(Xt), the only difference in the amount of evasion chosen at time t + s
by an audited and a non-audited taxpayer is due to the treatment, that is, the
occurrence of the audit. Let us define as matched(m) the non-audited taxpayer
who has the same value of Xt as the audited taxpayer that we observe. Thus,
we can rewrite (1.4) as
[Y
TU(m)
t+s −Y RU(m)t+s ]− [Y TAt+s −Y RAt+s ] = [Y RAt+s −Y RU(m)t+s ]− [Y TAt+s −Y TU(m)t+s ] (1.6)
We now need to deal with the issue of the unobservability of true incomes.
The average value of 1.6 could be estimated if we could assume that
E[Y TAt+s ] = E[Y
TU(m)
t+s ] (1.7)
that is, if, on average, matched unaudited taxpayers have the same true
incomes as audited taxpayers. However, this assumption is rather unrealistic,
so we revert to estimating the difference-in-differences using observations from
year t.
Thus, instead of (1.6), we aim to estimate the difference between the change
in evasion for unaudited taxpayers
[Y
TU(m)
t+s − Y RU(m)t+s ]− [Y TU(m)t − Y RU(m)t ] (1.8)
and the same change evaluated for audited taxpayers
[Y TAt+s − Y RAt+s ]− [Y TAt − Y RAt ] (1.9)
.8
8Note that in equations (1.8) and (1.9), we are ignoring that the audits conducted at time
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By assuming
E[Y TAt+s − Y TAt ] = E[Y TU(m)t+s − Y TU(m)t ] (1.10)
that is, that the change in true income for audited and (matched) unaudited
taxpayers is the same on average, then the average of the difference between
(1.8) and (1.9) can be estimated as the difference in the difference in reported
incomes, or
E[Y RAt+s − Y RAt ]− E[Y RU(m)t+s − Y RU(m)t ] (1.11)
To sum up, our identification strategy is based on a combination of matching
and of difference-in-differences. This approach is known in the literature as
conditional DiD or as the DiD matching estimator (see Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008), p. 55, and the literature cited therein).9
1.7 Matching
1.7.1 Estimation of the propensity score
The first step in estimating the propensity score is choosing the underlying
model, which includes both choosing a probit or logit specification and, most
importantly, choosing the variables to be included. Following the literature
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we include, in principle, only variables that
should simultaneously affect the participation decision and the outcome. In
this case, we include variables affecting the probability that a given tax report
t usually concern tax returns issued for years before t. This is the difference between the audit
and the base year that we analyzed in Section 1.4.
9Note that this estimator can be implemented either by estimating equation 1.11 or by
constructing matching estimates in both periods and calculating the difference between them.
The latter procedure is based on the estimation of E[Y RAt+s −Y RU(m)t+s ]−E[Y RA(m)t −Y RU(m)t ],
which is equivalent to equation 1.11 if independence is assumed.
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is selected to be audited by the Revenue Agency (the participation decision)
and evasion as decided by the taxpayer (the outcome).
Although the variables chosen by AE to select taxpayers to be audited are
the result of a complex process described in Section 1.3 and, thus, are not fully
known, some of them have been recently disclosed (AE, 2015) as follows:
• reported income;
• tax rate;
• region;
• sector;
• congruity to business studies;
• types of consumption;
• specific costs;
• VAT number.
As for the evasion decision, a large literature must to be taken into account.
Here, we briefly recapture the main measurable determinants emerging from
this literature.
The standard A-S model suggests considering, as determinants of the evasion
choice, the perceived probability of being audited, the marginal tax rate, and
risk aversion. For Italy, the probability of being audited is likely to be perceived
as associated with the congruity status, the sector of operation, as well as with
the region and province of residence. The marginal tax rate can be measured, in
our database, only with respect to reported income, and risk aversion is captured
using age and gender.
As is widely known, in the last twenty years the standard model has been
criticized, and explanations of tax evasion based on social interactions have
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been put forward (for a summary, see Hashimzade et al. (2014)). This stream
of research has led to the consideration of a number of variables as potential
determinants of the compliance level, such as:
• avoidance services that can be provided by tax consultants;
• tax morale;
• social customs prevailing in the context where the taxpayer operates;
• perceived fairness of the tax system.
Additionally, a recent literature has emphasized the importance of structural
variables, such as the incentives operating through the VAT paper trail (Pomer-
anz (2013)) for business-to-business activities and the presence of dependent
workers that could trigger whistleblowing risk (Kleven et al., 2009).
In our dataset, we can observe some types of consultancy as well as the
presence of dependent workers (see Section 1.4), but we observe at an individual
level neither tax morale nor social customs nor the share of B2B transactions.
Thus, we include the variables that simultaneously affect the participation
decision and the outcome decision and are measurable. However, we need to
perform this selection ensuring that variables are affected by the participation
decision or its anticipation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, p. 38). In particular,
congruity status depends partly on a variable (the level of reported turnover)
that a taxpayer chooses, and, thus, it is endogenous to the participation decision.
A non-congruous taxpayer knows that he has a higher probability of being
audited. For this reason, we do not include congruity status. Furthermore, we
do not include among the regressors income-related variables, such as specific
types of costs and consumptions indicated by AE (2015).
The final list of covariates inserted in the matching vector is provided in
Table 1.4.
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1.8 Discussion of the empirical approach
The validity of our identification strategy rests on assumptions of unconfounded-
ness (i.e., equation (1.5)) and of equality in average changes in reported incomes
(i.e., equation (1.10)).
The first assumption is common to all matching approaches and is equivalent
to assuming that the observed outcome does not depend on unobservables. As
noted by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) (p. 35), this assumption is strong and
needs to be justified by the quality of data at hand.
The assumption we make is that matched audited and non-audited taxpayers
would evade to the same degree if they were both audited or both non-audited.
Thus, the validity of our assumption rests on our ability to use the data to
identify the propensity to evade at an individual level. Moreover, since we
use the propensity score as our matching criterion, we need to identify the
variables that jointly determine the outcome (i.e., evasion) and the probability
of treatment (i.e., the probability of being audited). As we argue in subsection
1.7.1, we believe that we are, in principle, able to identify these variables and,
thus, to match, for every observed audit year, taxpayers who have the same
propensity to evade and the same ex-ante probability of being audited.
However, our claim needs to be strengthened by performing some robustness
checks. We exploit the richness of our database to run some placebo tests. We
define as an audit wave a combination of an audit year, a base year, and a
comparison year.
Considering the number of observations,10 we have a set of 21 observable
audit waves, which is illustrated in Tables 1.9 and 1.14, where we further dis-
tinguish between after-audit, A and pre-audit, P years based on the reasoning
proposed at the end of subsection 1.3.1.
10We exclude audit waves for which the number of observations is too limited to allow for
the estimation of the propensity score.
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Table 1.9: Audit waves, base year 2007
Audit years↓ Comparison years−→ 2008 2009 2010 2011
2010 D A A A
2011 P D A A
2012 P P D A
A=after-audit year (in italics when few obs. available);
P=pre-audit year; D=dubious year
Table 1.10: Audit waves, base year 2008
Audit years↓ Comparison years−→ 2009 2010 2011
2011 D A A
2012 P D A
2013 P P D
A=after-audit year ; P=pre-audit year; D=dubious year
Of the 21 audit waves that can, in practice, be used for estimation, nine can
provide a test of the impact of the audit, whereas six can be used as placebo
tests. In particular, if the audit increases compliance, then we would expect
a positive and significant coefficient on the DiD estimator for “A” years and a
non-significant coefficient for the “P” years. Finally, in six cases, according to
our reasoning above, the impact of the audit is dubious.
The second assumption is that of equality in the average changes in reported
incomes (i.e., equation (1.10)). Note that this assumption is independent of that
of unconfoundedness. Indeed, even if random audits were available, it would
ideally be necessary to evaluate their impact on evasion rather than on reported
incomes. Clearly, there is no difference between these two if true income is
supposed to be unchanged. Although this assumption is quite strong, it is very
common in most empirical studies concerning tax evasion, where, since evasion is
not observable, taxable income is used as a response variable even when random
audits are available (see Kleven et al. (2011), ).
The main advantage that our approach offers with respect to the panel
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approach followed by Mazzolini et al. (2017) is that we can obtain results for
each audit wave.
If year fixed effects are irrelevant, one would expect that the impact of an
audit conducted at time t on a given base year would depend mainly on the
time lag between the after-audit year and the audit year.
On the one hand, the impact should be lower on returns referring to year
t − 1 since, for late audits, such tax returns may be subject to partial ex-post
adjustments, as explained in Section 1.3.1.
On the other hand, the impact on returns referring to year t+ s, with s > 0,
may be lower than that on returns referring to year t if there is a “decay rate”
in the updating process (Hashimzade et al., 2014), but we can actually observe
a maximum of s = 2, so this decay process may not be visible in our data.
This approach implies moving across the diagonals of Tables 1.9 and 1.10,
considering cells where an “A” is reported, and verifying whether the values of
the DiD matching estimator are similar in relative or in absolute terms.
Note that similarity would imply that the response to audits is driven mainly
by the time lag between the audits and the after-audit year and not by the
specific years that are under consideration. However, the economic crisis may
also play a role.
The Great Recession hit the Italian economy particularly hard in 2009, when
real GDP decreased by over six percentage points, or 4.9 percentage points in
nominal terms. In 2008, the economy had not yet been touched by the crisis,
whereas 2010 and 2011 were years of relative economic recovery.
The economic crisis may have influenced the response to audits across differ-
ent after-audit years for a given pair of audit and base years. One would expect
that, for example, a different response to an audit in year 2009 than in years
2010 or 2011 simply because year 2009 was deeply affected by the economic
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crisis.
1.9 Results
1.9.1 Choosing matching algorithm and assessing match-
ing quality
As discussed by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), various matching algorithms
are commonly used in the literature. Since there is no a priori understanding
of which algorithm is the best, the choice must be guided by the nature of
the data at hand and by the estimation strategy. Our database is very large,
so that algorithms such as radius exceed the computational capacity at our
disposal. Thus, we opt for nearest neighbor matching. Furthermore, since in
our estimation strategy we use the approach suggested by Abadie et al. (2004)
with the estimation of teffects for the five nearest neighbors, we find it natural
to use the same algorithm. Thus, we use the psmatch2 package with the five-
nearest-neighbor matching option.
Regardless of which algorithm is chosen, we must check that the algorithm
is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables (i.e., the components
of X) that we shall define as covariates in both the treatment and the control
group.
Various methods have been proposed in the literature. The basic idea behind
all of these approaches is to compare the situation before and after matching
and check if any differences remain after conditioning on the propensity score.
If there are differences, matching on the propensity score was not (completely)
successful, and remedial measures have to be performed (e.g., including inter-
action terms in the estimation of the propensity score).
A useful package is the psmatch2 software in Stata. In particular, this
38
software allows the relatively easy calculation of the following indicators:
• t-tests for the equality of means in the two samples. Before matching,
this is an unweighted regression on the whole sample, and significant co-
efficients are expected. On the contrary, after matching, the regression is
weighted using the matching procedure based on the on-support sample,
so no significant differences are expected11;
• the standardized bias (SB), which, for each covariate, is defined as the
difference in the sample means of the treated and matched control sub-
samples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variances
in both groups. One possible problem with this measure is that it does not
provide a clear indication of the success of the matching procedure, even
though in most empirical studies an SB below 3% or 5% after matching
is seen as sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, p.48);
• the variance ratio, which is calculated only for continuous covariates and
which should equal one if there is perfect balance. An asterisk indicates
variables with variance ratios that exceed the 2.5th or 97.5th percentiles
of the F-distribution of the relevant test statistic;
• the pseudo R2 obtained by re-estimating the propensity score on the
matched sample (i.e., the sample of participants and matched nonpar-
ticipants) and comparing the pseudo R2s before and after matching. The
pseudo R2 indicates how well the vector of regressors X explains the par-
ticipation probability. After matching, there should be no systematic dif-
ferences in the distribution of covariates between both groups, and, thus,
the pseudo R2 should be fairly low;
11Note that this is the same test as that performed within the psmatch option, but, in that
case, the t-test is performed within every block (i.e., every interval in which the observations
have comparable values of the estimated propensity score). With our database, however, this
operation generates a matrix of hundreds of cells for each audit wave and for every covariate in
every block, but no simple criterion for the critical percentage of significant tests is available.
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• a likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of all regressors in the probit
or logit model. The test should not be rejected before matching but should
be rejected after matching.
Table 1.11: Matching quality tests, matched observations
t-test* stand.bias** var.ratio*** pseudo R2 ˆlikel. ratio
base year−→ 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
audit year↓
2009 0 n.a 3% n.a 0 n.a 0.1% n.a 1 n.a
2010 0 0 1.1% 1.6% 1 1 0 0 1 1
2011 0 0 2% 2.1% 0 1 0 0 0.999 0.999
2012 0 0 2.8% 2.4% 0 0 0 0 0.948 0.992
2013 n.a 0 n.a 2.4% n.a 1 n.a 0.000 n.a 0.799
* number of covariates for which p-value is significant at the 5% level
** highest % std. bias for matched obs.
*** no of continuous covariates for which the variance ratios > the 2.5 and 97.5 pctile of
the F dbn. for unmatched obs.
ˆp-value for the χ2 statistic for the likelihood ratio test before matching
Table 1.12: Matching quality tests, unmatched observations
t-test* stand.bias** var.ratio*** pseudo R2 ˆlikel. ratio
base year−→ 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
audit year↓
2009 7 n.a 31% n.a 0 n.a 2.1% n.a 0 n.a
2010 7 6 50.1% 39% 0 1 4% 2.8% 0 0
2011 9 9 44% 115,4% 0 2 3,8% 11,5% 0 0
2012 8 10 18.6% 40.2% 2 2 1,7% 3,7% 0 0
2013 n.a 9 n.a 28.7% n.a 2 n.a 3.0% n.a 0
* no of covariates with p-value significant at the 5% level
** highest absolute value of standard. bias for unmatched obs.
*** no of continuous covariates for which the variance ratios > the 2.5 and 97.5 pctile of the
F dbn. for unmatched obs.
ˆp-value for the χ2 statistic for the likelihood ratio test before matching
These results are overall in line with expectations, and they confirm that the
matching procedure has made it possible to compare the comparables.
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1.9.2 Estimates
After matching, estimates are obtained using the new teffects psmatch com-
mand available in Stata. This command has one very important advantage over
the traditional psmatch2 command. It takes into account the fact that propen-
sity scores are estimated rather than known when calculating standard errors.
This difference often turns out to be significant, sometimes in surprising ways.
We implement this command using the five best nearest-neighbor matches, as
suggested in Abadie et al. (2004).
Tables 15 and 16 report the estimated value of the DiD estimation shown in
1.11 and expressed in euros.
Table 1.13: Estimation of treatment effect, various audit waves, single audits,
base year 2007
Comparison years−→ 2008 2009 2010 2011
Audit years ↓
2009 na na na na
2010 1,740 (7,4%) 473 (67.7%) 3,101 (8.7%) 4,242 (3.6%)
2011 541.7 (48.2%) 429.9 (52.8%) 2665.5(1.1%) 3032.0(0.1%)
2012 1335.3 (4.9%) 855.0 (27.9%) 1202.65 (17.1%) 2549.7 (0.6%)
p-values with robust SE in brackets
Table 1.14: Estimation of treatment effect, various audit waves, single audits,
base year 2008
Comparison years−→ 2008 2009 2010
Audit years ↓
2011 119.2 (87%) 2,845.1 (0.1%) 4,448.3 (0.0%)
2012 2,251.8 (24.9%) 1938.0 (10.8%) 2,863.7 (1.1%)
2013 11.06 (98.9%) 1027.8 (17.6%) 2,033.7 (1.3%)
A=after-audit year ; P=pre-audit year; p-values with robust SE in brackets
Overall, our results are summarized in Table 1.15.
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Table 1.15: Summary of results, base years 2007 and 2008
Type of comparison year Obs. Sig. at 10% Non Sig. at 10%
A 9 8 1
P 6 1 5
D 6 2 4
A=after-audit year ; P=pre-audit year
The hypothesis that audits do change subsequent compliance seems con-
firmed, since in eight out of nine of the after-audit years, a positive and sig-
nificant DiD estimate is found, whereas in five out of six placebo years, a non-
significant DiD estimate is found. Furthermore, the dubious nature of year t−2
seems to be confirmed, since two out of six of these years have a significant DiD
estimate, whereas four do not.
1.9.3 Robustness using other matching approaches
There are many possible approaches to matching, and we consider some alter-
natives.
Regression adjustment (RA) is a methodology that aims to use sample means
to estimate the treatment effect. By estimating a regression model adjusted on
selected covariates, RA predicts the potential outcomes of a treatment. Specif-
ically, the treated and untreated observations are used to fit linear regressions
that predict the outcome of receiving or not receiving the treatment.
RA is a two-step methodology. The first step is the estimation of two dif-
ferent regression models for the outcomes of different covariates of the treated
and untreated population. The second step is the estimation of the averages of
the predicted for each subject for each treatment level. The difference in these
averages provides quantification of the average treatment effect on the treated.
A brief description of this methodology is presented in Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008), along with a short literature.
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To estimate these results, we use the previously mentioned command avail-
able in Stata, teffects psmatch. Moreover, we use the default settings in the
program and let the software estimate the outcome.
Table 1.16: Estimation of treatment effect, various audit waves, single audits,
regression adjustment, base year 2007
Comparison year
Audit year 2008 2009 2010 2011
value se value se value se value se
2009 na na na na na na na na
2010 1,995.3 3.8% 815.2 47.4% 3,477.8 5.3% 4,288.9 3.2%
2011 580.2 45.2% 565.4 41.1% 2,778.1 0.7% 3,043.7 0.1%
2012 1,284.6 5.9% 847.6 28.5% 1,467.0 9.1% 2,724.7 0.2%
Table 1.17: Estimation of treatment effect, various audit waves, single audits,
regression adjustment, base year 2008
Comparison year
Audit year 2009 2010 2011
value se value se value se
2011 317.5 64.9% 2,878.6 0.1% 4,393.2 0.0%
2012 2,589.6 18.2% 2,014.9 9.1% 2,852.4 1.1%
2013 96.3 90.4% 1,067.9 16.7% 2,046.0 1.4%
Another estimate is carried out using the Stata command teffects psmatch
to perform radius matching using the propensity score values used previously.
Instead of following the settings in Abadie et al. (2004), the maximum number
of possible neighbors is set equal to 100 with a caliper equal to 0.01. Using
these settings, it is possible to have a large numbers of matches within a certain
radius. Unfortunately, no estimations were feasible for the base year 2008, so
Table 20 reports only the estimates for base year 2007.
These results are consistent with the previous ones obtained following the
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Table 1.18: Estimation of treatment effect, various audit waves, single audits,
radius matching, base year 2007
Comparison year
Audit year 2008 2009 2010 2011
value se value se value se value se
2009 na na na na na na na na
2010 1,751.4 7.6% 361.0 75.6% 2,932.7 10.7% 4,229.5 3.7%
2011 536.7 49.0% 481.7 48.4% 2,824.5 0.7% 3,131.3 0.1%
2012 1,546.8 2.5% 1,197.6 14.6% 1,389.7 11.3% 2,797.8 0.2%
suggestions provided by Abadie et al. (2004). The teffects psmatch command
allows for other methodologies as well, but they could not be implemented
because of the extensive resources required.
These results are similar to those obtained by Mazzolini et al. (2017) who,
using a different approach, obtains an overall average estimate of approximately
3.5 thousand euros of additional compliance generated by audits on average in
the period between 2007 and 2011.
However, as outlined above, our approach allows us to further explore the
nature of the audit impact.
First, it seems that the impact is driven mainly, although not exclusively, by
the time lag between the audit year and the after-audit year. More precisely,
the impact of an audit conducted in year t can be summarized as:
• an increase in income reported in tax returns referring to year t − 1 by
approximately 2.5-3 thousand euros;
• an higher increase in income reported in tax returns referring to years t
and t + 1, ranging from approximately 3 to approximately 4.5 thousand
euros;
Note also that, although the absolute DiD values are quite constant for a
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given time lag, they change substantially relative to average reported values 12.
The second result is that the only after-audit year for which we obtain a
non-significant result is 2009, which is the peak of the economic crisis in Italy.
Thus, it seems plausible that the Great Recession has limited the impact of
audits on subsequent tax compliance.
1.10 Concluding remarks and directions for fu-
ture research
In this study, we use a unique database to empirically investigate the impact
of audits on subsequent tax compliance in Italy. Our empirical approach uses
a combination of matching and difference-in-differences techniques and exploits
the richness of our database to run some placebo tests.
We show that, on average, the impact of audits on subsequent compliance in
Italy between 2007 and 2011 is positive and significant, that it is mainly driven
by the time lag between the audit year and the after-audit year, and that it is
possibly limited by the economic crisis.
This result is interesting outside the Italian context as well. As we argued
before, Italy is a country with low tax morale and low efficiency of tax institu-
tions. Ceteris paribus, we expect operational audits in countries such as the US
and Denmark to have greater effects that those estimated here.
This intuition is somewhat confirmed by Beer et al. (2015). They use op-
erational audits conducted by the IRS and provide evidence that these audits
have important long-term revenue implications. Three years after an audit, the
average small business taxpayer reports around 20 percent more income. This
amount is more than twice that estimated by DeBacker et al. (2015a) using
12A proper evaluation of the relative impact of the audit would require using logs rather
than levels. However, doing so would exclude negative differences.
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random rather than operational audits.
A further development of this work could utilize the data to determine the
underlying criteria by which tax returns are selected for audit by the Italian
Revenue Agency. Since the panel data set includes the universe of taxpayers
who reside in three of the main regions of Italy (Lombardy, Lazio, and Sicily)
over the tax years 2007-2011 as well as the tax returns selected for audit by
the Italian Revenue Agency, it is possible to combine these data to estimate
the (observable) factors that determine audit selection. Only a few studies have
been able to estimate such audit selection criteria, and such an investigation
will certainly enrich this field.
Appendix 1.A The use of true income
The previous section illustrates the empirical strategy that has been imple-
mented following the existing literature to extract the most from the observa-
tions included in the database. An alternative approach could be based on true
income, as follows:
• Observe taxpayers who are audited in an specific year (say 2007);
• Measure the difference between their reported incomes in 2007 and their
true incomes in 2007 (i.e., their incomes as assessed by the Revenue Agency
after the audit);
• Observe their reported incomes in subsequent years.
However, true income would be observable only for a minority of audited
taxpayers.
Tables 9 and 10 show the audits that take place, the differences between true
and declared incomes, and the relative changes in the taxes due. The audited
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taxpayers comprise a minority of the 528,540 total taxpayers included in the
database, as the table reports.
Table 1.19: Total number of audits, with single audits in brackets
Base year
Audit year 2007 2008
2008 69
(56)
2009 630 47
(452) (15)
2010 1,551 582
(1,052) (175)
2011 3,625 3,039
(2,290) (2,073)
2012 8,199 5,416
(5,139) (3,198)
2013 161 7,816
(89) (5,601)
Total 14,235 16,900
(9,078) (11,062)
Table 1.20: Differences between declared and audited incomes and the effects
on taxes.
Declared Declared % Additional Additional %
income tax income tax
2007
All taxpayers 33,773 11,240 33.28%
Audited 44,238 22,611 51.11% 24,177 14,360 59.40%
2008
All taxpayers 34,043 11,579 34.01%
Audited 44,433 23,627 53.17% 29,943 17,267 57.67%
The possible changes due to an audit are observed for just a limited amount
of the sample. Income in 2007 is audited just 14,235 times, and income in 2008
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is audited 16,900 times. Since approximately 4% of the sample is audited, the
best way to use this information is to highlight the effect of an audit in the
following years.
Thus, we use the reported income, as does all of the literature that observes
audits.
A possible example is Kleven et al. (2011), who run a randomization test on a
sample of Danish taxpayers to verify the effect of an audit. Specifically, following
the existing literature, the work considers treated and untreated taxpayers (who
are ex ante identical) to understand the component of tax evasion and the effect
of an audit after one year. Looking at the amount of evaded income by self-
reporting taxpayers for tax year 2006 (reported in 2007), it emerges that the
amount of tax evasion is equal to 41.6%. It then appears that the degree of
correction caused by an audit is remarkable in other countries as well in close
years when audits are random and performed on self-reporting taxpayers, as in
our database.
1.A.1 The empirical approach with the use of the ”true”
income
Apart from the methodology that is implemented before, it is also feasible to
implement a different one. As stated before, it is impossible to observe twice
the same subject, in this particular case if she is audited or not. It is possible
however to observe the change in the predicted income due to the audit using a
matching technique.
A different approach can be based on these steps:
• Predict the evasion of the non audited taxpayers using the predictions of
a two steps Heckman simulation.
• In the audited year t, the ”true” income is estimated. For the audited
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taxpayers, it will be sum of the declared income plus the not declared one
resulting from the audit. For the not audited taxpayers, it will be the sum
of the declared income plus the predicted evaded one.
• In the next years t+n (with n ≥ 0 ) it is estimated the difference between
the declared income in the year t+n and the ”true” income in year t.
• With a combination of matching and DID the treated subjects, the audited
ones, are matched with ex-ante similar not treated ones, the non audited.
This methodology is tested using the audit year 2007 and, as comparisons,
years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The parameters of the first step (prediction
of the treatment) of the Heckman simulation are selected considering internal
works of RA such as Braiotta et al. (2015). In this paper there is a com-
plete analysis of the tax evasion of self employees taxpayers in Italy through
a propensity score analysis. The research of the best variables to include in
the Heckman simulation started from this work. Unfortunately some variables
relevant inBraiotta et al. (2015) are not in the database (such as the number of
luxury cars and the amount of electricity consumption). Some others are not in
that work but provided to be a good predictor (such as sex and percentage of
not adherence to sds) .
The parameters included in the second step are instead estimated testing
the variables included in the database. After various attempts, the variables
that emerged as the most significant are: the declared income, the due tax and
the percentage of not adherence to sds.
Results are reported in the table 1.21and they are estimated using the Stata
command ”hekman” together with the options ”twostep” and ”first”.
Unfortunately, the best simulation provide a poor prediction of the evasion.
The Pseudo R2 is just equal to 0.0531. It is worth noting that all the other
possible combinations of variables ended up in a even worst results. To observe
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Table 1.21: Estimation of the ”true” income using the Heckman selection model,
year 2007.
ratio correction Coef. Std. Err. z P¿z
ratio correction
perc noadeg sds 0.007493 0.003781 1.98 0.048
redd imp -0.0001 2.65E-05 -3.9 0
imp impst netta 0.000242 6.27E-05 3.86 0
cons 1.1312 0.403619 2.8 0.005
select
1.sex -0.03276 0.009728 -3.37 0.001
perc noadeg sds -0.00221 0.000134 -16.49 0
redd imp -2.79E-06 8.14E-07 -3.43 0.001
imp impst netta 6.01E-06 1.90E-06 3.16 0.002
congruo -0.06767 0.011838 -5.72 0
coerente 0.156239 0.008403 18.59 0
tot pass -2.06E-07 1.38E-08 -14.9 0
qta part iva -0.03837 0.005965 -6.43 0
imp iva dovuta -1.46E-06 3.15E-07 -4.65 0
imp iva credito -2.04E-06 5.15E-07 -3.96 0
val agg fisc 1.58E-07 5.88E-08 2.69 0.007
num dipendenti -0.0182 0.001342 -13.56 0
imp sps dipend smp -3.61E-06 1.98E-07 -18.21 0
cod reg
Lazio -0.45467 0.009347 -48.64 0
Sicilia -0.45497 0.010124 -44.94 0
cons 2.32189 0.017829 130.23 0
mills
lambda 3.961183 3.125948 1.27 0.205
rho 0.04882
sigma 81.13833
Pseudo R2 0.0531
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the difference in the ”true” income between audited taxpayers and non audited
ones, a comparison between the average declare incomes can be useful.
Table 1.22: Average declared and average ”true” incomes of audited and non
audited taxpayers, year 2007
Audited Taxpayers Non audited taxpayers
Delared income 44,238 33,773
”True” income 65,348 41,195
To match the taxpayers, the chosen variables for the simulation are the
same ones of the previous part. The RA methodology is implemented because,
although the different methodologies provided similar results, the RA proved to
be the most quick one in providing the estimations. The results are reported in
the following table
Table 1.23: Differences between declared incomes and ”true incomes” , RA
methodology, different approach.
Comparison year
Audit year 2008 2009 2010 2011
value se value se value se value se
2009 na na na na na na na na
2010 -24,591 0.00% -25,859 0.00% -23,060 0.00% -22,226 0.00%
2011 -21,135 0.00% -21,235 0.00% -18,904 0.00% -18,612 0.00%
2012 -16,462 0.00% -16,974 0.00% -16,296 0.00% -15,026 0.00%
Results proved to be highly influenced by the prediction of the evasion for
the non audited taxpayers. As reported before, the predicted correction in the
income of the non audited taxpayers is very limited if compared to the one of
the audited ones. The DID between the matched individuals then is negatively
influenced by the fact that the ”true” income of non audited taxpayers is far
lower than the ”true” income of the audited ones.
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Appendix 1.B Complete results for the other match-
ing approaches
2007 Regression adjustment
Audit 2010 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 1,995.3 963.2 2.1 3.80% 107.5 3,883.0
diff 09 815.2 1,138.2 0.7 47.40% -1,415.7 3,046.1
diff 10 3,477.8 1,795.1 1.9 5.30% -40.5 6,996.1
diff 11 4,288.9 2,000.8 2.1 3.20% 367.3 8,210.4
Audit 2011 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 580.2 771.7 0.8 45.20% -932.3 2,092.7
diff 09 565.4 687.6 0.8 41.10% -782.4 1,913.1
diff 10 2,778.1 1,032.3 2.7 0.70% 754.9 4,801.3
diff 11 3,043.7 929.6 3.3 0.10% 1,221.7 4,865.7
Audit 2012 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 1,284.6 680.5 1.9 5.90% -49.2 2,618.4
diff 09 847.6 793.1 1.1 28.50% -706.9 2,402.1
diff 10 1,467.0 869.3 1.7 9.10% -236.8 3,170.8
diff 11 2,724.7 894.6 3.1 0.20% 971.3 4,478.1
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2008 Regression adjustment
Audit 2011 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 09 317.5 698.4 0.5 64.90% -1,051.2 1,686.3
diff 10 2,878.6 838.0 3.4 0.10% 1,236.2 4,521.0
diff 11 4,393.2 919.6 4.8 0.00% 2,590.8 6,195.6
Audit 2012 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 09 2,589.6 1,940.9 1.3 18.20% -1,214.5 6,393.7
diff 10 2,014.9 1,194.0 1.7 9.10% -325.2 4,355.0
diff 11 2,852.4 1,116.4 2.6 1.10% 664.4 5,040.5
Audit 2013 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 09 96.3 796.9 0.1 90.40% -1,465.6 1,658.3
diff 10 1,067.9 771.9 1.4 16.70% -445.0 2,580.9
diff 11 2,046.0 835.8 2.5 1.40% 407.7 3,684.2
2007 Radius mimic
Audit 2010 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 1,705.7 980.4 1.7 8.20% -215.8 3,627.3
diff 09 466.5 1,132.9 0.4 68.10% -1,754.0 2,687.0
diff 10 3,197.1 1,793.8 1.8 7.50% -318.8 6,712.9
diff 11 4,105.2 2,006.3 2.1 4.10% 173.0 8,037.4
Audit 2011 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 320.4 778.4 0.4 68.10% -1,205.2 1,846.0
diff 09 57.3 696.8 0.1 93.40% -1,308.4 1,423.1
diff 10 2,371.6 1,045.5 2.3 2.30% 322.5 4,420.7
diff 11 2,629.6 941.9 2.8 0.50% 783.6 4,475.7
Audit 2012 Coef. R. Std. Err. z P - value [95% Conf Interval]
diff 08 1,196.3 681.1 1.8 7.90% -138.7 2,531.2
diff 09 649.4 790.1 0.8 41.10% -899.3 2,198.0
diff 10 1,371.1 869.4 1.6 11.50% -332.9 3,075.1
diff 11 2,701.9 890.4 3.0 0.20% 956.8
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Chapter 2
A Minimum Tax in Italy:
Impact on Revenues and
Redistribution
Urpis, E.
2.1 Introduction
This study investigates the effects of implementing a presumptive tax in a coun-
try like Italy, which has a low level of tax compliance compared to other devel-
oped countries. The main aim is to study the effect of a change in the policy
from a particular starting condition. More specifically, this analysis compares
the initial level of taxes collected in Italy from a particular group of taxpay-
ers, to levels that would be collected if the country implements a particular
presumptive tax.
This work will then show in which particular case it is convenient to im-
55
plement presumptive taxation to collect taxes. Given that Italy has some dif-
ficulties in collecting taxes due, this study investigates whether implementing
a presumptive tax will be a good solution to this problem. Moreover, the pre-
sumptive tax proposed here is of a particular form: a minimum tax. The work
I present will study the impact of a presumptive tax in the Italian context, and
show the viability of a minimum tax implementation and describe the particular
case in which it is a viable policy to increase the total amount of taxes collected,
while also limiting the drawbacks.
Presumptive taxes are characterized by a change in the tax base. In previ-
ous years, they were considered a viable solution to tackle compliance issues in
different states. If a tax base is difficult to observe, it is possible to approximate
it to one that is easier to measure. However, this shift can bring some draw-
backs, the pros and cons of which have been analyzed in recent years; among
all Yitzhaki (2007), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1994) and Balestrino and Galmarini
(2005). They can lower the administrative costs for tax agencies and the com-
pliance costs for tax payers; moreover, they are relatively easy to implement.
However, at the same time, presumptive taxes lower the degree of precision and
cause concerns about both horizontal and vertical equity.
The existing literature focuses mostly on describing presumptive taxes from
a theoretical point of view or describing different presumptive tax implemen-
tations in the countries that decided to adopt them. Theoretical studies have
extensively described the main characteristics of these taxes together with their
costs and benefits. Some works illustrate the technical issues of their implemen-
tation, while others focus on the impact on specific aspects (such as the effects
on labor, influence on business choices, etc.). Moreover, the economic literature
provides several contributions illustrating the implementation of presumptive
taxes in different contexts.
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This work enriches the existing literature with some insight on the effects
of presumptive taxes when they are implemented as minimum taxes. More
specifically, it provides precise and effective estimates of the implementation by
using a large and reliable database. Since implementing a minimum tax would
affect the taxpayer behavior, this work will also compute the effects that possible
taxpayer reactions might have on the final outcome. This study computes three
levels of reactions and illustrates the changes in the results for each.
Using a database provided by the Italian Revenue Agency (RA), this study
estimates the impact of a minimum tax on the total amount of taxes collected
and calculates the redistributive issues that this would bring. To do so, it imple-
ments two different presumptive taxes related to the methodologies developed
by Istat and the RA. The analysis concerns a very specific group of taxpayers
whose characteristics are discussed in detail.
The work is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the theoretical back-
ground of this research and defines presumptive taxes and minimum taxes; Sec-
tion 3 provides a brief description of the two methodologies to estimate the
presumptive taxes; Section 4 describes the database, and finally, Section 5 illus-
trates and discusses the results.
2.2 Literature review
Governments levy presumptive taxes when it is difficult for them to obtain
reliable information on the declared tax base, or when the information they
collect is not reliable. To address this problem, the taxpayer declared tax base
is substituted with a presumptive one, estimated by another body like the public
administration, which is easier and more reliable to observe.
The existing literature on presumptive taxation can be divided into three
groups: studies that provide a theoretical analysis of the characteristics of pre-
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sumptive taxes and the effects on subjects, works that investigate the drivers of
the adoption of these taxes, and other studies that describe effective implemen-
tations in different contexts.
Among the research in the first group, Yitzhaki (2007) provides a very gen-
eral and complete definition of presumptive taxes, stating that we have pre-
sumptive taxes “. . . whenever the legislator is using one tax base in order to
approximate another.” This shift between the tax base and real tax is the core
of presumptive taxation. When one activity is difficult to observe or it is possi-
ble for the taxpayer to easily a hide part or activity, the government prefers to
link the tax of one particular base to one that is easier to observe. Presumptive
taxes arise whenever it is hard for a tax agency to collect the proper information
or it finds it difficult to implement the tax laws.
Yitzhaki (2007) also provides a list of the pros and cons of presumptive tax-
ation. Presumptive taxes are characterized by simplicity, low compliance costs,
and low administrative costs, while still guaranteeing equal opportunity for tax-
payers to organize their activity. However, there are also some drawbacks, such
as, a lower degree of accuracy and the need constantly update the parameters
to estimate the presumptive tax. Some other characteristics are more subtle;
for example, there is no final word about horizontal equity. Moreover, when an-
alyzing these taxes, we should consider that it is sometimes difficult to classify
a tax presumptive or not since ”... all taxes are presumptive to some degree”
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1994).
Other works focus on more specific characteristics of presumptive taxes and
past implementations over time. Bulutoglu (1995) discusses the advantages and
disadvantages in the context of developing countries. He investigates how a
presumptive income is implemented and how presumptive tax models approxi-
mate revenues, costs, or other assets. In this work, presumptive taxes are seen
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as an alternative to audits, distinguishing when it is not negotiable and when
taxpayers can challenge the presumptive tax, who bear the cost of the proof.
Instead, Balestrino and Galmarini (2005) put more emphasis on the behavior
of the subject involved. They use an occupational choice model to investigate
the effects of implementing a presumptive tax on entrepreneurs and workers.
In more detail, they provide an analysis of the redistribution issues and effi-
ciency changes following the negative effects that presumptive taxes have on
the resources invested in counteracting tax avoidance.
Some other studies, such as Akerlof (1978), Immonen et al. (1998) and Boad-
way and Pestieau (2006), focus on more technical details, such as the calibration
of the tax and the identification of the groups involved. Among these, Immonen
et al. (1998) focuses the analysis on tagging and means testing, investigating
the right balance between them.
The second group of studies describe the reasons that might drive the gov-
ernment to implement such taxes. Larin and Jacques (1994) illustrate the three
reasons that drive a government’s decision to implement these taxes:
• Tax preferences restrictions: an attempt to counter taxpayer planning
with counter-planning;
• Attempts at redistribution: a state can attempt to redistribute a minimum
amount of money away from taxpayers who have successfully exploited the
tax system;
• Administrative countermeasure: as an aid for states with insufficient au-
diting facilities to investigate taxpayers’ strategic tax-planning.
This list makes it possible to understand the reasons that push different
states to adopt presumptive taxes. For developing countries, they can be a
good way to deal with the lack of resources to invest in audit activities. On the
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contrary, developed countries can effectively implement them to let the highest
taxpayers pay a minimum amount of taxes. In the latter context, presumptive
taxes avoid large investments in tax planning from undermining the progressive-
ness of a tax system. To support their work, they provide a complete list and
the main characteristics of the different presumptive taxes in Europe, Africa,
and North and South America, showing how presumptive taxes differ from state
to state.
The final group of studies instead describes how presumptive taxes were
implemented in different countries. Some, such as Stotsky (1995), illustrates
the pros and cons considering various experiences over time. Others are more
specific and illustrate the experiences of single countries, such as the study by
Gamarra Rondinel (2017), who uses the bunching approach to investigate the
responses of the Argentinian firms to the implementation of a simplified regime,
Pashev (2006), who describe the experience of Bulgaria, or Wallace et al. (2002),
who focuses on Russia.
The object of this work is to study whether introducing a minimum tax can
be a viable solution for a country affected by a low degree of tax compliance,
such as Italy. The originality of this work is in the econometric analysis that it
provides. Some previous studies analyze a database to study the implementa-
tion of presumptive taxes. Works such as Larin and Jacques (1994) investigate
the effects of a presumptive tax implementation in Canadian presumptive on
different groups of taxpayers. Logue and Vettori (2011) investigate the possibil-
ity of narrowing the tax gap in the United State by implementing a presumptive
tax. This work however will go further by providing an empirical estimation of
the effect of the implementation while also considering taxpayers’ reactions.
In more detail, this study investigates whether such an introduction will be
effective in collecting supposedly undeclared taxes. The choice of implementing
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a minimum tax should also account for the costs associated with such a decision.
As Slemrod (2007) points out, each tax implementation brings issues of fairness
and efficiency. Together with the benefits associated with increases in revenues,
this work also considers that the cost of the decreased redistributive effect of
taxation causes a loss of disproportionality. The trade-off between an increase
in revenues and a decrease in the differences in the shares of taxes is expected.
Finally, it should be remarked that this work adopts two different method-
ologies to estimate presumptive taxes, which are very specific to the Italian
context since they are implemented by two of the largest bodies that estimate
the shadow economy. The Istat one is based on Franz (1985)’s pioneering work
and aims to estimate the Italian GDP. The methodology developed by Istat to
estimate shadow income is illustrated in detail with some estimations by Pug-
gioni (2015). Santoro and Fiorio (2011) and Dal Prato (2016), among others,
describe the RA’s methodology and the historical background that led Italy to
develop this particular methodology to estimate taxpayers’ incomes a priori,
and illustrate the parameters to estimate the presumptive tax base in detail,
with a remarkable reference to the Italian context.
2.3 Theoretical background
2.3.1 Implementation of a minimum tax
The introduction of presumptive taxes brings different effects that require in-
vestigation. First, taxpayers can react to the introduction of presumptive taxes;
second, a redistributive effect can arise among taxpayers.
To better analyze taxpayers’ behavior to the introduction of presumptive
taxes, imagine a finite cohort of taxpayers j (with j = 1, 2,. . . ,..n), and denote
declared taxes with T jD and presumptive taxes with T
j
P . In turn, these can be
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written as
T jD = τ(y
j
D)y
j
D (2.1)
T jP = τ(y
j
P )y
j
P (2.2)
where τ(yj) is the average effective tax rate, yjD is the declared tax base,
and yjP the presumptive tax base. Clearly, if the tax schedule is progressive,
τ ′(.) > 0, and an increase in the tax base will cause an increase in τ(yj). Suppose
that the tax rule dictates that, for each j, the tax to be paid is equal to
T j = max(T jD, T
j
P ) (2.3)
This means that the presumptive tax is actually implemented as a minimum
tax. Our purpose is to evaluate the impact of introducing this minimum tax
instead of a rule that simply prescribes that taxpayers must pay T jP . To do so,
we consider two changes:
• the change in aggregate tax revenues, ∆R;
• the change in the coefficient of concentration of taxes paid with respect to
the ranking of declared incomes, ∆C.
We must conduct the evaluation by observing incomes as declared only before
the minimum tax rule is implemented. If taxpayers comply with the new policy
and pay the taxes on the maximum between the declared and presumptive taxes,
by definition, aggregate tax revenues will increase after the tax reform, that is,
we will observe
∆R = |RP −RD| > 0, (2.4)
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where RP is the revenue with the minimum tax and RD the declared revenue.
To evaluate the change in the concentration of taxes, consider that according
to Yitzhaki (2007), the “distributional characteristics of the presumptive tax
tend to be worse than those of the regular tax,” since “the presumptive tax rate
tends to be lower on [. . . ] higher income taxpayers.” To capture this inequity
in the presumptive tax, we measure the change in the disproportionality effect
with respect to declared incomes. For every progressive tax system, Kakwani
(1977)’s theorem states that the disproportionality effect can be measured by
the difference
GT −GY , (2.5)
where GT is the Gini index of taxes paid and GY is the Gini index of income
declared. Indeed, if the tax and income rankings are the same, a progressive tax
system would generate a positive value of (5) because the proportion of taxes
paid by any x% of the poorest taxpayers should not exceed the proportion
of income declared by the same x% of the poorest taxpayers. In graphical
terms, the Lorenz curve of taxes should be further from the 45◦ line than the
Lorenz curve of income, thus generating a higher Gini index. In contrast, a flat
tax would generate GT = GY . This also implies that, for a given ranking of
declared incomes, the decrease in the concentration coefficient of taxes denotes
a loss in the disproportionality effect of the tax system. Now, in general, since
the presumptive taxes tend to be higher on lower incomes, one would expect to
observe
∆C = (CP −GY )− (CD −GY ) = CP − CD < 0, (2.6)
where CP and CD are the concentration coefficient 1 of presumptive and
1The tax implementation changes the order of taxpayers compared to their earnings. Since
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reported taxes, respectively, with respect to the ranking of reported incomes.
For these reasons, one expects the minimum tax to decrease the disproportion-
ality of taxes, and, therefore, their ability to redistribute income. The latter
statement is debatable if one considers that declared incomes are not true in-
comes. Thus, the loss in disproportionality may be irrelevant since the bench-
mark (i.e., declared taxes) is biased by evasion. Nevertheless, declared incomes
(and taxes) are a benchmark or reference point that taxpayers use to evaluate
the (in)equality of taxes. Following this line of reasoning, the difference CP−CD
can be interpreted as a measure of the departure from this benchmark.
2.3.2 The equity-efficiency trade-off
As illustrated in the previous subsection, one expects the tax reform to increase
revenues but to decrease disproportionality. While the former can be seen as
an advantage of the reform (abstracting away from considerations about the
efficiency of public spending relative to the decrease in private consumption), the
latter can be seen as an equity cost of the reform. As 2.4 shows, implementing a
minimum tax increases the total amount of tax collected. This happens because
taxpayers with T jP > T
j
D pay more taxes, while taxpayers with T
j
P < T
j
D are not.
Since the upward correction of taxes hits only some taxpayers, the proportion of
taxes paid changes. As 2.6 shows, implementing a minimum tax causes a change
in the concentration of taxes paid. The correction reduces the disparity because
just some taxpayers pay more taxes; consequently, taxes paid are shared more
equally. From 2.4 and 2.6, the trade-off is always present. Moreover, an increase
of the amount of tax collected brings a stronger decrease in the concentration.
As stated before, we evaluate this trade-off for the Italian case. To do so,
the Gini index is computed by ranking the values from the lowest to the highest, a comparison
of the Gini index of income and taxes will be misleading due to the different rankings. For this
reason, it makes more sense to estimate the concentration coefficient of the minimum taxes
ordered by declared incomes and then compare it to the Gini index of declared taxes.
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however, we must consider the possibility of taxpayers’ reactions.
2.3.3 Taxpayers’ reactions
To properly evaluate taxpayers’ reactions, we should run a natural experiment,
comparing reported incomes before and after the introduction of a minimum
tax. Unfortunately, our database does not allow for this possibility. Thus, to
evaluate the impact of the reform on revenues and the concentration of taxes
paid, we require some simplified hypotheses. Namely, two possible reactions are
considered:
• A change in the intensive margin: taxpayers with reported incomes above
the presumptive incomes would consider paying less taxes by paying the
latter (levelling effect).
• A change in the extensive margin: taxpayers with reported incomes be-
low the presumptive ones may find it too expensive to comply with the
taxes calculated over the latter incomes and may thus consider leaving the
market (leaving effect).
Each taxpayer will react with one of four different behaviors. This study
considers a parameter σ inversely related to taxpayers’ reactions. This param-
eter ranges from 0 to 1, with a σ equal to 1 representing no reaction, while a σ
equal to 0 represents the maximum reaction. Graphically, for a given value of
σ, we can divide the population of taxpayers into five groups:
• Group 1: taxpayers with T jD < T jP and (1 − (T jD/T jP )) > σ. For this
group, it is too costly to pay the taxes on the presumptive income and
they consequently decide to leave the market 2, so they are affected by
the leaving effect.
2This study assumes that if the difference between T jD and T
j
P is too broad, the taxpayer
prefers not to produce goods or services and leaves the market. Since T jD are taxes that the
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• Group 2: includes taxpayers with T jD < T jP , but who are also characterized
by (1− (T jD/T jP )) < σ. These subjects have declared taxes lower than the
presumptive ones but decide to stay in business and pay a higher level of
taxes.
• Group 3: taxpayers with T jD > T jP and (1 − (T jP /T jD)) < σ. Taxpayers
whose declared taxes are higher than the presumptive ones, but who pay
the declared taxes since they determine that the cost of a possible audit
will be higher than the difference between the two taxes.
• Group 4: taxpayers with T jD > T jP and (1− (T jP /T jD)) > σ. This group is
characterized by higher declared taxes than presumptive taxes, but they
pay the presumptive tax since the difference is so high that they find it
more profitable to pay the presumptive tax and risk incurring the cost
associated with an audit, so they are affected by the levelling effect.
• Obviously, in this setting, subjects with T jD = T jP simply pay the reported
taxes, which are exactly equal to the presumptive taxes.
Figure 2.1: Potential distribution of taxpayers
It is possible to represent graphically such dynamics. In fig.2.1the taxes
(presumptive and declared) are set in the horizontal axe. We can observe how
taxpayer would declare before the implementation of a minimum tax, while T jP are the taxes
estimated with a reasonable methodology, the difference between T jD and T
j
P is the estimated
evasion. The parameter σ then represents taxpayers’ willingness with T jD < T
j
P to accept the
upward correction of taxes.
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the magnitude of σ influences the taxpayers’ participation in each group.
Looking at the figure, it is possible to see that groups 1 and 4 increase as σ
decreases. This happens because the more the taxpayers are reactive, the more
they will tend to leave the market or to pay the presumptive taxes because the
declared taxes are too high compared in comparison.
These reactions then cause a change in the total amount of income, and their
average value changes. Implementing a minimum tax will then cause an income
effect on taxpayers. If taxpayers in group 1 leave the market and earn noth-
ing, they will experience the most severe consequences of this implementation.
Instead, group 2 will pay more taxes and will thus be affected by a negative
income effect. Group 3 will be unaffected, while group 4, paying less taxes, will
have a positive income effect. The change in the concentration of the taxes is
measured with the concentration coefficient with regard to the ranking of (ob-
served) reported incomes. Finally, we should point out that the collected taxes
might change, but not the presumptive taxes, since they are based on observed
incomes.
We consider three possible values of the parameter σ: high (85%), medium
(50%), and low (15%).
It is also possible to represent the relationship between the declared and pre-
sumptive taxes, which appear on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively,
in Figure 2. Taxpayers with T jD = T
j
P will be in the bisector, while groups 1
and 2 will be on the left of the bisector and groups 3 and 4 on the right.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship T jD and
j
P
The magnitude of σ then will split groups 1 and 2 and groups 3 and 4.
Considering the part of the graph to the left of the bisector, as σ increases, the
line dividing the two groups will move toward the y axis. When σ approaches
1, the numerator of (T jP − T jD)/T jP approaches T jP . This measures the increase
in taxpayers’ willingness to stay in the market if they have to pay presumptive
taxes higher than the declared taxes. At the same time, an increase in σ causes
a shift downward in the line dividing the part of the graph to the right of the
bisector. In this case, with σ approaching 1, the numerator of (T jD − T jP )/T jD)
approaches T jD. This captures the increase in taxpayers’ willingness to comply
with the policy and pay the declared taxes, even if they are higher than the
presumptive ones.
To summarize, the analysis first investigates the implementation of a mini-
mum tax without reactions. The study considers the effects of the change in the
total amount of tax collected and the change in the disproportionality. Later,
we address the research question in three scenarios: low, medium, and high,
corresponding to strong, intermediate, and mild taxpayer reactions.
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2.4 Methods
Two different estimations of presumptive taxes are implemented to analyze
whether a particular estimator affects the final result. To do this, a corrected
income is first computed using two different methodologies, and then the pre-
sumptive taxes are calculated for each. It should be remarked that all taxes are
estimated following the prescriptions of Italy’s income tax. These methodolo-
gies were developed by two prestigious Italian associations: Istat and the RA,
which are analyzed in detail in the appendix 2.B.
Both methodologies are micro-founded (based on taxpayers’ declarations),
but their aims differ. Istat developed its methodology to quantify GDP, while
RA aims to estimate the amount of taxes that each taxpayer does not declare,
since the Istat methodology has a macro purpose (treating the taxpayers in bulk)
versus the RA’s micro purpose (a personal presumptive tax base is estimated
for each taxpayer).
Istat developed a methodology that aims to calculate a threshold level, the
shadow income, or the presumptive statistical income, to compare with the de-
clared income and estimate underreported incomes. The main intuition behind
this methodology are that entrepreneurs work full time for their firms, which
exist in a context of perfect competition. The key assumption is that in normal
conditions, the income earned by an entrepreneur or a professional cannot be
lower than the income they could earn by working as a dependent worker doing
similar tasks. If that happens, then the reported income can be considered to
be affected by underreporting.
Following this approach, the income declared should be corrected and in-
creased to at least the salary of a dependent worker. The whole methodology
can be considered as a comparison between the declared income and a threshold
level, the presumptive statistical income, to estimate underreported amounts.
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The only requirement is the existence of workers doing similar tasks who can
provide a benchmark for this comparison. Once this condition is fulfilled, it is
possible to compare the declared income of all entrepreneurs to the presumptive
statistical income and correct the supposed underreported declarations upwards
to the presumptive income level.
Details of this methodology are included in the appendix 2.B. However, it is
possible to briefly illustrate Istat’s methodology to estimate the shadow income
of taxpayers with virtually not dependent workers when they do and do not
have high skill levels and Istat call it G1.
In case the taxpayer has a low skill level, the Istat methodology aims to
cluster taxpayers in homogeneous groups to collect the normalized and non-
normalized salaries of managers, clerks, and workers to estimate the presumptive
income of each cluster. If the declared income of a taxpayer is lower than the
presumptive income of the cluster, then the income is corrected upward to the
presumptive income.
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Population
Correction of declared
income if below
presumptive income
Identifying the
stratification variables
Comparison of
declared income to
presumptive income
Stratification using
the CART algorithm
Presumptive in-
come estimation
Creation of nodes
Normalized and
non-normalized
labor cost estima-
tion for managers,
clerks, and workers
For taxpayers with high skill levels, the methodology is very similar to the
previous one. The main difference is that the information about managers,
clerks, and workers salaries are used to identify compliant taxpayers. After
identifying compliant taxpayers, it is possible to use the information included
in their declaration to set a profit function to estimate presumptive income.
Again, after estimating presumptive income, if the declared income is less than
the presumptive income of the cluster, then the income is corrected upward to
the presumptive income.
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Population
Correction of declared
income if below
presumptive income
Identifying the
stratification variables
Comparison of
declared income to
presumptive income
Stratification using
the CART algorithm
Presumptive income
estimation with
a profit function
Creation of nodes
Identify compliant
individuals considering
dependent workers
The RA methodology differs because it is based on identifying several pa-
rameters to estimate the presumptive tax base. The methodology is called the
studi di settore (SDS). It first collects various information on internal (costs,
structure, productive process, etc.) and external variables (degree of market
competition, prices, etc.) of a selected sample of taxpayers. A cluster analysis
of this information estimates the presumptive income of each taxpayer by adopt-
ing multiple regression techniques. It is important to stress that this procedure
is not based on a sample analysis, but each step includes constant research on
the most sensitive variables that influence the final result.
Both methodologies aim to correct the declared income of taxpayers who
are supposedly non-compliant. However, as the description suggests, the cor-
rection might differ since the assumptions and implementation differ. The Istat
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methodology corrects the taxpayer clustering by assigning them to homogeneous
groups such that taxpayers with below-average incomes are corrected. More-
over, if taxpayers declare an income close to zero, the Istat correction might be
severe. The RA methodology instead estimates the presumptive income for each
taxpayer considering their personal characteristics. The RA’s methodology can
correct the information about more taxpayers, that is, it also addresses high-
income taxpayers if their incomes are higher than average. Moreover, it can also
correct information for very low-income taxpayers less severely compared to the
Istat methodology. Using the RA methodology with certain parameters, it is
possible to estimate a very limited presumptive income using taxpayers’ charac-
teristics. Given their differences, it is expected that the Istat methodology will
correct fewer taxpayers, but do so more intensively, while the RA method will
correct more taxpayers, but for smaller amounts.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 The database
This study uses a database provided by the RA, Agenzia delle Entrate. This
database is a balanced panel that reports various information and statistics
declared by Italian residents living in three regions of Italy. In this panel,
taxpayers are observed over a period between 2007 and 2011. Moreover, there
are no employed subjects: all records refer to self-employed taxpayers and sole
proprietorships.
The database is organized in terms of the Istat’s methodology to estimate
GDP and the real size and characteristics of the Italian economy. Since this
study investigates the effects of introducing a minimum tax related to a very
specific group, taxpayers will be rearranged in terms of the Istat’s methodology
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to analyze this group.
The database contains all of the information declared by taxpayers in the
different reports they must file throughout the fiscal year. The information
concerns demographic (age, sex, etc.) and economic characteristics (returns,
workforce, etc.). Moreover, there is also information specific to each taxpayer
on prior undeclared income estimated by the RA; the SDS provides an initial
insight into the loyalty of a taxpayer.
The dataset consists of a balanced panel of 528,540 selected taxpayers living
in Lombardy, Lazio, and Sicily during 2007 and 2011. The taxpayers included in
the analysis are those outside the agricultural or related sectors, since revenues
in these sectors are estimated on a forfeit basis. Unfortunately, this study
cannot use all of these subjects since some of them do not fulfil all the minimum
requirements. For example, for 2007, some units were deleted since they had
more than 100 dependent workers (37,488) 3, others because they do not provide
any information about the SDS (57,041), and so on. After filtering, 434,011
subjects remain for 2007 and the following estimations are based on these units.
This analysis does not include 2008 since it is not possible to calculate the
presumptive tax for this year with the Istat methodology.
Following the Istat methodology, it is possible to classify subjects into five
groups. All taxpayers must fulfil the Istat specification precisely; any taxpayer
missing just one characteristic are placed in Group 0. The appendix describes
characteristics of this classification. Because subjects can change characteristics
over time, Table 1 provides the classification for 2007, which will be considered
as the base year.
3Since this work investigates taxpayers with few dimensions, it includes only taxpayers
with fewer than 100 dependent workers consistently with the Istat methodology implemented
to create the Emens database.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of subjects among classifications, 2007.
Group Lombardy Lazio Sicily Total
0 177,466 78,502 57,596 313,564
G1 12,332 6,666 4,623 23,621
G1A 110 66 27 203
G1B 10,780 5,769 4,130 20,679
G1C 1,442 831 466 2,739
G2 30,600 13,792 12,882 57,274
G3 2,809 904 983 4,696
G5 19,215 8,851 5,912 33,978
G5A 1 3 1 5
G5C 17,232 8,120 5,659 31,011
G5D 1,982 728 252 2,962
Total 242,422 108,715 81,996 433,133
A large part of the sample falls into group 0 because these subjects do not
fulfil at least one of the requirements for inclusion in the in Istat’s classifications,
for example, they are too young, do not report all information, there is no
indication of congruity, and so on. Moreover, the G4 does not show any units
since this group’s characteristics (such as being part of an Italian group) are not
observed in the database. Additionally, G5B, firms in a particular situation,
refers to firms with characteristics that are not included in the database, and
thus none of these units appear in the table.
Not all regions of Italy are included; the database covers only three regions
Italy: Lombardy, Lazio, and Sicily. This choice was made for two reasons. First,
these are the most populated regions of each Italian macro area (North, Center,
and South). The three Italian macro areas have homogenous socioeconomic
variables within them and heterogeneous characteristics between them. It was
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considered suitable to choose representative regions in terms of population to
highlight any possible differences among taxpayers related to geographical areas.
There are 242,422 subjects from Lombardy, 108,715 from Lazio and 81,996 from
Sicily. Taxpayers are therefore not equally distributed: Lombardy has almost
half of the sample, and this makes sense considering that Lombardy is the region
with the most economic activity.
Looking at the pool of taxpayers used for all analyses (the study uses all
subjects to estimate the presumptive income of G1), the subjects are distributed
among the different sectors and regions, as Table 2 shows.
Table 2.2: Distribution of subjects by activity, 2007.
Sector Lombardy Lazio Sicily Total
Industry 17,407 4,899 6,836 29,142
Commodities 0 0 0 0
Water 121 42 40 203
Construction 39,560 10,907 9,677 60,144
Commerce 59,154 31,790 30,726 121,670
Transportation 8,669 2,188 2,250 13,107
Hotels & restaurants 8,752 5,328 4,899 18,979
Information 5,063 2,007 563 7,633
Finance 3,463 1,601 932 5,996
Real estate 3,110 1,381 457 4,948
Professional 65,950 34,677 17,595 118,222
Holidays 5,530 2,180 1,268 8,978
Public admin. 1 3 1 5
Education 185 139 147 471
Healthcare 12,698 5,237 3,313 21,248
Arts 1,221 1,952 378 3,551
Other services 11,538 4,384 2,914 18,836
Servants 0 0 0 0
International org. 0 0 0 0
Total 242,422 108,715 81,996 433,133
Most taxpayers are concentrated in a few sectors (commerce and other ser-
vices), while some other sectors can be considered marginal. The following sec-
tion illustrates the two methodologies to quantify tax evasion. These methodolo-
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gies will correct the reported incomes for these sectors and provide an estimation
of the evaded incomes.
2.5.2 Group 1 characteristics
This study focuses on the G1 group, which includes mostly small entrepreneurs
and professionals. G1 contains taxpayers where the owner’s work is similar to
that of a dependent worker. These units are characterized by a very low level
of capital and the largest input in the production function is the individual’s
personal work, while the use of workers or fixed assets is seen as an obstacle to
freedom of activity. The main characteristics are:
• Not being a limited company or controlled by a limited company;
• Not having non-working members;
• Adheres to the minimum tax scheme;
• Declares total revenues less than e 30,000;
• Independent workers hired less than 1.5 but higher than zero;
• Dependent workers hired virtually null, less than 0.5;
• Being older than 30 years.
There are multiple reasons for choosing this group. First, this study should
focus on analyzing taxpayers that have a real possibility of tax evasion. For
this reason, this database, which includes only self-employed taxpayers and sole
proprietorships, is a good choice. This group of taxpayers has the possibility to
deliberately hide part or all of their economic transactions, and thus efforts to
counteract evasion focus on this group.
Self-employed persons and sole proprietorships are included in different groups:
among all groups, this study focuses on G1. Provided the information included
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in the database, it is possible to replicate the methodology for G1. The different
estimations by various institutions (such as Istat, Banca d’Italia, the RA, etc.)
find evidence that this group has the minimum level of tax compliance. It is
common knowledge that G1 taxpayers evade a taxes great deal, but their size
is so small that the total amount of tax not declared is just a minor part of
the revenues that the revenue agency does not collect. The low level of compli-
ance make this group quite interesting to study, and the relatively limited size
makes it possible to implement a unique methodology to correct under-declared
incomes.
Moreover, G1 is divided into three smaller groups, which are described fully
in 2.A. Table 2.3 summarizes the average incomes, standard deviation, and
minimum and maximum incomes for all of the taxpayers in G1.
Table 2.3: Income summary.
Year N AV Income SD Min Max
2007 23,621 17,262.67 24797.73 0 1,085,999
2009 25,130 17,105.82 30547.70 0 2,120,081
2010 25,422 17,437.90 42259.59 0 4,253,140
2011 25,381 18,225.51 57575.03 0 7,652,803
Table 2.4: Group 1 distribution of subjects by activity.
Activity 2007 2009 2010 2011
Tot % Tot % Tot % Tot %
Industry 875 3.70 1,091 4.34 1040 4.09 1025 4.04
Construction 3,205 13.57 3624 14.42 3687 14.50 3609 14.22
Commerce 5,685 24.07 6031 24 6094 23.97 5942 23.41
Other serv. 13,856 58.66 14,384 57.24 14,601 57.43 14,805 58.33
Tot. 23,621 100 25,130 100 25,422 100 25,381 100
The table shows no significant variation in taxpayers’ activities and that the
most represented category is other services, while commerce and construction
are less represented, and industry is a marginal choice.
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Unfortunately, the information in the database does not allow an estimation
of shadow incomes for the other groups. As taxpayers increase in size and com-
plexity, the methodologies to estimate shadow incomes become more complex,
and require more variables. Sadly, no other Istat methodology could be imple-
mented considering the variables included in the database. For this reason, this
study provides estimations for G1 only.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Outline
Now that the characteristics of presumptive taxation have been outlined, the
possible reactions described, and the differences between the two methodologies
illustrated, it is possible to quantify the magnitude of the introduction of the
minimum tax.
This section aims to shed some light on the effects of introducing minimum
taxation, particularly looking at the variation in the tax collected, the changes in
the concentration, and the differences in taxpayers’ participation in the market.
The main purpose will be, then, to provide a more precise description of the
intuitions introduced earlier. Prior studies show that introducing a minimum
tax causes an increase in the tax collected, but potential taxpayer reactions (the
leaving and levelling effects) might alter the results of the base case.
Since the presumptive taxes are estimated using two different methodologies
to correct income, there will be a brief description of the differences between
them.
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2.6.2 Differences in the income corrections
Since this study uses two methodologies to calculate the presumptive incomes
that form the tax base for presumptive taxation, it is important to highlight the
differences between them. The previous section illustrated that these method-
ologies have different purposes and characteristics. Thus, the variations in the
estimation of presumptive incomes are a direct consequence of these different
characteristics. The Istat presumptive statistical income was estimated follow-
ing the Istat methodology to estimate shadow income, and the results for the
observed years are shown in Table 5.
Table 2.5: Income correction: Istat methodology.
Year Declared Presumptive % Istat Official
2007 335,084,142 530,516,033 158.32%
2009 359,081,559 706,243,593 196.68%
2010 373,081,476 668,567,155 179.20% 178.50%
2011 387,303,089 687,194,856 177.43% 162.60%
The presumptive incomes are significantly higher than the actual incomes,
and this is true for all years. Moreover, Istat provides an official estimation for
G1 for 2010 and 2011. As Table 6 shows, the calculated presumptive incomes
are quite close to the Istat official values, validating this work. The database
includes the RA’s presumptive operational income. Table 6 compares the actual
incomes.
Table 2.6: Income correction: RA methodology.
Year Declared Presumptive %
2007 335,084,142 474,117,969 141.49%
2009 359,081,559 507,661,835 141.38%
2010 373,081,476 484,345,553 129.82%
2011 387,303,089 487,154,145 125.78%
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2.6.3 Differences in the correction
Starting with the initial case, where there are no reactions to the introduction of
a minimum tax, as specified by 2.4, we expect the total amount of tax collected
to increase and the disproportionality described by 2.6 to decrease.
If we consider an initial distribution of taxes and incomes declared by tax-
payers as in 2.3, it is easier to observe an improvement after implementing a
minimum tax. Comparing the initial state with the images showing the dis-
tributions of taxpayers whose tax base was modified in consideration of both
methodologies in 2007 4. We expect to see an increase in the tax collected for
taxpayers with a low declared tax base. Thanks to the graphical representation,
it is possible to see the effect of introducing a presumptive tax.
In all the figures below, the order of taxpayers on the x axis represents the
declared tax base. By not changing the order in the x axis, it is easier to
appreciate the differences after changing the settings. The dots represent the
declared income and taxes paid by each taxpayer. The changes in the position
of the dots represent how implementing a minimum tax changes the taxes due
while incomes remain the same.
If the Istat presumptive tax is implemented, several taxpayers will pay more
and the differences in the scatter representation of the two images show an
increase in the total amount of tax collected. We observe a shift upward of the
distribution of the taxpayers, meaning citizens are paying more taxes. Moreover
the distribution of taxpayers changes, suggesting that the proportion in taxes
paid also differs. It is possible to observe that a shift upward in the taxes paid,
especially for taxpayers with incomes below e 30,000.
4For graphical reasons, the next figures include only the taxpayers with a total tax base
(also including non-evadible income) of less than e 100,000 and taxes lower than e 40,000
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Figure 2.3: Declared taxes
Figure 2.4: Istat presumptive taxes
Figure 2.5: RA presumptive taxes
It is possible now to determine whether the same results are obtained using
the RA’s methodology. If we compare the introduction of the RA’s presumptive
taxes (Figure2.4 ) to the declared taxes (Figure2.3 ), we can draw the same con-
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clusions as for the Istat methodology. Introducing a minimum tax will increase
the total amount of tax revenue and will cause a change in the coefficient of
taxation.
Specifically, it is possible to compare the effect of introducing presumptive
taxes using the two different methodologies.
Both methodologies increased the tax collected compared to reported taxes.
However, the two images show an upward correction in declared taxes, but also
show unequal amounts in the corrections.
The previous representations gave the insight that introducing a minimum
tax caused an increase in the total amount of tax collected. This insight was
unambiguous from the results using both methodologies, although there were
some differences between the graphs.
Table 2.7: Changes in revenues and concentration with two different method-
ologies
Istat 2007 2009 2010 2011
∆ revenues 61.2 % 114.5% 87.6% 84.9 %
∆ concentration -27.9 % -57.8% -49.7% -46.6 %
RA 2007 2009 2010 2011
∆ revenues 45.7 % 50.2 % 29.7 % 25.6 %
∆ concentration -26.0 % -29.7 % -29.9 % -25.4 %
The results clearly show that for both methodologies without reactions, there
is a significant increase in the tax collected and a decrease in the variation in
the concentration. There are some differences for each year, but the general
tendency shows that all of the variations are in the expected directions.
Specifically, it appears that the two methodologies differ not only in terms of
the total amount of revenues collected when implementing a minimum tax, but
also some differences in the variations of the concentrations: the Istat method-
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ology provides a higher change in the concentration. This happens because this
methodology corrects taxpayers declaring incomes much lower that the pre-
sumptive incomes more strongly. The RA methodology does not correct these
taxpayers so much, and thus the RA correction preserves more of the dispro-
portionality that was present before the minimum tax implementation.
If the government introduces a minimum tax, and leaving and levelling ef-
fects are absent, there is a remarkable increase in the tax collected. In the
simulations with the taxpayers included in the database, the total increase in
the collected revenues ranges from 25% to 114%. Moreover, the increase in the
tax collected occurs with both methodologies, although the Istat method brings
higher increases than that of the RA method.
Fig. 2.6 represents the effect of the distribution of the fiscal burden among
taxpayers. The analysis focuses on the results for both methodologies for 2007
only. As the previous table suggests, the results for all years are very similar;
thus, a single representation of both methodologies using Lorenz curves (with
the population on the horizontal axis ordered by declared income and taxes paid
on the y axis) helps to clarify the main dynamics for all observed periods.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of taxes before and after the minimum tax implemen-
tation, Istat methodology
Considering that the x axis refers to the population ordered by declared
taxes, it appears that most of the upward correction concerns low-income declar-
ing taxpayers. Using Lorenz curves helps to show that introducing a minimum
tax will move the Lorenz curve of the fiscal burden towards the line of perfect
equality, signaling a new, lower difference in the tax collected. Thus, adopting
the Istat methodology, T jD < T
j
P taxpayers pay more taxes, and subjects with
the lowest declared taxes are corrected the most.
If the same exposition is proposed for the RA methodology, we can observe
similar results. The results in Table 2.7 confirm that for the RA method as
well, introducing a minimum tax will increase the total amount of tax collected
and reduce the concentration of the fiscal burden. Moreover, as with the Istat
methodology, the RA methodology brings similar results for all observed years.
Provided these characteristics, fig. 2.7 represents only 2007 since the analysis
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is similar for all years and can be extended to the other periods without loss of
generalizability.
Figure 2.7: Comparison of taxes before and after the minimum tax implemen-
tation, RA methodology
If a minimum tax is used, as in (6), it appears that presumptive taxes make
taxpayers with low declared incomes pay more taxes. Since this result is very
similar to the Istat result, the same conclusions can be drawn. Introducing a
minimum tax will affect taxpayers with low declared incomes more.
2.6.4 Effects of reactions to the minimum tax introduction
The previous section explained that introducing a minimum tax may cause some
reactions from taxpayers. Recalling the earlier illustrations, there can be two
different effects: a leaving effect and a levelling effect.
If we consider the outcomes by analyzing different levels of sigma and main-
taining the order of taxpayers’ declared tax base on the x axis, it is possible to
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analyze the reactions in terms of the leaving and levelling effects.
Moving from mild to strong reactions, we can analyze the scatter distribution
of all taxpayers. In these three figures, the x axis has the declared tax base to
keep the same order in the distribution of the subjects, while the y axis shows
the taxes declared after the subjects are aware of the presumptive taxes and
can pay based on their level of reaction.
Figure 2.8: Istat presumptive taxes with high, medium, and low σ
As σ changes, the remaining subjects are almost divided into two groups: a
higher and a lower one. In the higher group, we have subjects in groups 2 and 3,
while in the lower group, we have subjects in group 4. It is possible to observe
that as σ decreases and the reactions become stronger, the upper group of
subjects decreases (as groups 2 and 3 shrink), while we find that the lower group
includes more subjects (group 4 increases). Considering these effects together,
the total amount of tax collected will be lower since there are fewer taxpayers
in the market (due to the leaving effect) and more remaining subjects will pay
less taxes (the levelling effect). At the same time and for the same reasons,
the coefficient of concentration should also be affected since as σ decreases, the
coefficient of concentration should increase.
Unfortunately, the figures above do not allow for a clear representation of
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the subjects leaving the market. Since there are more than 20,000 observations,
it is necessary to provide a representation of these subjects separately better
understand them because they change with different levels of σ. In the next
figures, we observe the leaving effects considering that the y axis shows the
presumptive taxes of subjects who decide to leave the market. The figures then
show the taxes that are not collected and the negative effects of a high level of
reactions to the minimum tax implementation.
Figure 2.9: Istat methodology: Taxpayers leaving the market when T jD < T
j
P
with high, medium, and low σ
These figures show the scatter representation of the presumptive taxes of
subjects leaving the market for three σ settings. As σ decreases, more taxpayers
consider the presumptive taxes too expensive and decide to leave the market.
Now, it is possible to analyze the levelling effect. If we look at the subjects
in Sector 4, with declared taxes below e 15,000, we obtain the following figures.
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Figure 2.10: Istat methodology: taxpayers paying presumptive taxes when T jD >
T jP with high, medium, and low σ
We see that as σ decreases, the number of subjects included in group 4
increases. This means that more taxpayers are paying a lower level of taxes since
their declared taxes are lower than the presumptive ones, causing a decrease in
the total amount of tax collected.
Considering all figures together, it appears that an increase in taxpayers’
reactions decreases the total amount of tax collected, since more taxpayers leave
the market or declare presumptive taxes. Moreover, there are also changes in
the concentration of taxes paid. Due to the leaving and levelling effects, fewer
taxpayers are in the market and the remaining participants will pay similar
taxes as σ decreases, causing a change that will be measured by the coefficient
of concentration.
The next figures show how reactions will affect the final outcome using the
same levels of reactions but with the RA methodology. As before, the exposition
of the results will focus first on taxpayers’ overall responses, while the differences
among the groups will be investigated secondly.
The following figures show the total effect with different levels of σ, starting
with the case of low reactions (σ high) and moving to strong reactions (σ low).
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Figure 2.11: RA methodology: presumptive taxes with high, medium, and low
σ
It is possible to observe that now the subjects are less dispersed and, as σ
decreases, there is a consequent increase in the number of the subjects below
the line, where most of the taxpayers lie.
The changes are caused by the reactions becoming stronger. As σ decreases,
more taxpayers leave the market or pay presumptive taxes. As the images show,
the total amount of tax collected decreases while the change in the coefficient
of concentration moves in the opposite direction.
To clarify the leaving and levelling effects, it is better to analyze taxpayers
in the same way as for the Istat methodology.
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Figure 2.12: RA methodology: taxpayers leaving the market when T jD > T
j
P
with high, medium, and low σ
Observing how taxpayers with T jD < T
j
P behave, when reactions are stronger,
more taxpayers consider that paying the presumptive tax is too expensive.
Group 1 increases and more taxpayers leave the market.
Finally, it is possible to observe what happens in group 4, where subjects
pay presumptive rather than the actual taxes when T jD < T
j
P .
Figure 2.13: RA methodology: taxpayers paying presumptive taxes when T jD >
T jP with high, medium, and low σ
Here, we can see an increase in the number of the subjects as σ increases.
The levelling effect makes more subjects move from group 3 to group 4, paying
presumptive taxes rather than declared taxes, causing a fall in the total tax
collected.
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It is possible to draw the same conclusions, as the Istat methodology are
duplicated for the RA methodology, although the figures shows different scatter
distributions due to the differences in the methodologies. Stronger reactions
are associated with decreases in the total amount of tax collected and in the
concentration of the tax paid. What is crucial is that the levelling and leaving
effects are present in both methodologies, and the next section provides a more
precise quantification of these effects.
To analyze the combined effects of these two reactions, it is possible to have
a look at the total tax collected and at the concentration among the taxpayers.
The figures in the previous section already show the results of the effects in
three different contexts: strong, intermediate, and mild taxpayer reactions. It
is thus possible to observe the main dynamics, understand the roles of taxpayer
reactions, and quantify the final effects.
Starting with the Istat methodology, we want to observe how the total taxes
collected changes as the reaction becomes stronger, how many taxpayers con-
tinue to stay in the market, and how the concentration of taxes paid changes.
Table 2.8: Changes in revenues and concentration: Istat methodology with
different levels of σ.
Istat 2007 2009
Low mid High Low Mid High
∆ revenues -53.70% -10.80% 35.00% -57.50% -17.50% 43.60%
∆ concentration -3.30% -11.20% -22.70% -3.90% -13.70% -32.20%
∆ population -64.20% -45.20% -20.50% -69.50% -54.00% -29.00%
2010 2011
Low mid High Low Mid High
∆ revenues -43.09% -16.75% 13.32% -44.67% -16.28% 19.68%
∆ concentration -8.62% -14.44% -25.24% -3.20% -12.47% -28.56%
∆ population -64.29% -51.88% -36.17% -67.21% -54.29% -34.58%
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The results show that as taxpayers’ reactions become stronger (from σ low to
σ high), we experience a severe loss in market participation. It is also possible
to notice that as the reactions increase (lower σ) there is an increase in the
concentration of taxes paid. By a change in the concentration, we mean that
the difference between the Gini index of the taxes paid and the concentration
index of taxes, in the same order as that of the taxes paid.
If we want to control the differences in the distribution of taxes, it is possible
to represent the Lorenz curves with different levels of σ. In Figure 14, the x axis
is the same order of declared taxes, while the y axis shows the different taxes:
actual taxes without reaction and taxes paid with different reaction levels. Note
that this figure excludes the subjects that decided to leave the market.
Figure 2.14: Comparison of distributions of the fiscal burden with different
reaction levels, Istat methodology.
The graphical representation shows us that introducing different levels of
reaction brings important changes to the distribution of the fiscal burden. If
reactions are limited (σ high), we observe that the fiscal burden is more homo-
geneous among taxpayers: from the Lorenz curve, we move towards the line of
perfect equality. However, as the reaction become stronger, we observe that the
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Lorenz curves move away from the line of perfect equality due to the leaving
and levelling effects.
Once we see the main dynamics for the Istat methodology, it is possible to
focus on the effects of the same reactions on the introduction of a minimum tax
with the RA methodology.
Table 2.9: Changes in revenues and concentration with RA methodology and
different levels of σ
RA 2007 2009
Low mid High Low Mid High
∆ revenues -27.90% -7.30% 19.90% -22.80% -8.90% 11.60%
∆ concentration -4.80% -8.10% -18.30% -7.30% -11.00% -23.50%
∆ population -46.30% -35.60% -20.50% -40.50% -33.90% -23.00%
2010 2011
Low mid High Low Mid High
∆ revenues -7.90% -0.40% 10.90% -8.70% -0.50% 11.10%
∆ concentration -10.30% -12.40% -18.30% -11.90% -14.00% -20.10%
∆ population -32.60% -27.90% -20.40% -31.80% -26.70% -18.60%
The representation of the correction is the same as for the Istat methodol-
ogy. The table represents the effects of introducing a minimum tax with three
different reaction levels and the results are proposed for all years available.
It appears that the results are very similar to those of the Istat method. As
reactions become stronger (from σ high to σ low), fewer taxpayers participate in
the market, less resources are collected, and the variation in the concentration
increases. Although the results are different, we observe that the main dynamics
are the same as for the Istat methodology.
It is now possible to use the Lorenz curves to illustrate the distribution of
the fiscal burden and see how this distribution changes with different reaction
levels.
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Figure 2.15: Comparison of the fiscal burden distribution with different reaction
levels and the RA methodology.
Although the Lorenz curves change, meaning that the correction using the
RA methodology differs from the Istat correction, the main dynamics are the
same as for Istat. Introducing a presumptive tax with a low reaction level (σ
high) brings a higher level of equality, and so the Lorenz curve is closer to the
line of perfect equality than that for declared taxes. However, as the reaction
becomes stronger, the leaving and levelling effects change the concentration
coefficients, causing the Lorenz curve to move away from the line of perfect
equality.
In conclusion, it is possible to observe that the correction from the two
methodologies also changes when we introduce reactions. It appears that the
effect of increasing reactions affects the change in revenues and the population
differently, since the Istat methodology gives more extreme results than the
RA methodology. Regarding the change in the concentration, this study finds
evidence that the Istat methodology is characterized by a remarkable change
when reactions are weak. However, as reactions strengthen, the change decreases
compared to the RA methodology, meaning that a large part of the correction
already occur when reactions are low.
95
2.6.5 A different representation
It is possible to provide a different representation of the distribution of the
taxpayers. If we consider their in the vertical axe still the presumptive taxes
while in the horizontal one the declared ones (instead of the tax base) the
relationship between the two taxes can be analyzed in a different perspective.
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Figure 2.16: Relationship between declared taxes and Istat presumptive taxes
Starting with the Istat methodology, we observe in fig. 2.16 that the pre-
sumptive taxes bring an increase of the amount of tax collected. The same
representation can be obtain using the RA presumptive tax.
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Figure 2.17: Relationship between declared taxes and RA presumptive taxes
Also fig. 2.17 shows an increase in the total amount of tax collected, but the
correction seems to be more disperse than the previous one. Also this different
representation catch the differences between the two methodologies. As re-
ported before the Istat methodology corrects taxpayers declaring incomes much
lower that the presumptive incomes more strongly. Instead the RA method-
ology does not correct these taxpayers so much, and thus the RA correction
preserves more of the disproportionality that was present before the minimum
tax implementation as 2.7 measured..
Once reactions are included, it is possible to observe how the relationship
between the declared tax and the presumptive tax changes. As before the istat
methodology is analyzed first.
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Figure 2.18: Relationship between declared taxes and Istat presumptive taxes
with sigma high, medium and low
If the reactions of taxpayers change as in fig. 2.18, from a low level of
reaction (a) to a high level of reaction (c), more taxpayers declare lower taxes.
Since more taxpayers with T jD > T
j
P are choosing to pay the presumptive taxes
and so they are passing in the lower part of the bisector. As before above the
bisector we have the taxpayers included in sectors 2 and 3 while taxpayers in
sector 4 are in the lower part. If the level of reaction moves from a mild level to
a strong one taxpayers in sector 2 leave the market, while taxpayers in sector 3
move to sector 4.
The same dynamics arise if we consider the RA methodology. As for Istat,
we select three different levels of reactions and observe how taxpayers behave.
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Figure 2.19: Relationship between declared taxes and RA presumptive taxes
with sigma high, medium and low
Also in this representation, moving from a low level of reaction (a) to a high
level of reaction (c) the number of taxpayers above the bisector are decreasing.
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The differences with the Istat simulation are due to the peculiarities of these
methodologies The same dynamics that are described for the Istat methodology
apply for the RA one, in a different way though.
2.6.6 Trade-off between revenues and concentration
It is now possible to focus on the effects of introducing a minimum tax on
revenues and concentration. After the analysis, it is possible to focus on Yitzhaki
(2007) and his predictions.
Adopting both methodologies without reactions from taxpayers, we find that
introducing a minimum tax increases the total revenues in all years analyzed.
Although there are differences between the two methodologies and the yearly
results, introducing a minimum tax increases the total amount of tax collected
significantly compared to the actual revenues. This increase ranges from 25.6%
to 114.5%, meaning that introducing a minimum tax has an unequivocal positive
effect on tax revenues.
Another effect is the change in the concentration of taxes. Considering
the various years and methodologies, there is an unambiguous decrease in the
variation in the concentration. As for the increase in revenues, the results are
quite varied and range from -25.4% to -57.8%; thus, the effect is also clear for
the concentration of taxes.
If taxpayers can react to the introduction of a minimum tax, it is possible
to observe that the total amount of revenue collected is higher than from the
declared tax, assuming a low level of reaction (σ high). At the same time,
it is possible to observe that a limited number of taxpayers leave the market,
but the variation in the concentration is important. If reactions are strong (σ
low), the total amount of tax collected is inferior to the total amount of tax
declared, a high number of taxpayers leave the market, and the variation in the
99
concentration is quite contained.
Observing the results, it emerges that with moderate reactions (σ medium),
the total amount of tax collected is almost the same as the declared taxes, but
there are two differences: fewer people participate in the market and there is a
significant difference in the distribution of taxes.
2.7 Conclusions
The analysis suggests that introducing a minimum tax would be not convenient
when taxpayers begin to have significant reactions. When reactions become
considerable, the total amount of collected taxes will be less than the total
amount of declared taxes, but with a lower level of participation in the market
and a continuing disproportional effect, although it is limited. If taxpayers’
reactions are limited and there is a trade-off between higher revenues, then
limited variation in participation and a significant variation in concentration
should be considered.
In a context of limited reactions, implementing a minimum tax can be jus-
tified by lower compliance costs for taxpayers and lower costs for the public
administration. Among the reasons Yitzhaki (2007) identifies, it emerges that
minimum taxes are mostly used in underdeveloped countries, since their imple-
mentation is quite easy and the only way for states with limited resources to
invest in a modern tax system. Moreover, minimum taxes can also be a viable
solution for some developed countries. If compliance costs are high and it is too
costly for a revenue agency to run book audits, implementing a minimum tax
can be a good solution for financing the state in an economical way.
If limited reactions characterize Italy, implementing a minimum tax will be
a viable policy. Since some reports 5 consider the Italian tax system as one of
5Among, these ”Doing business” by Price Waterhouse Coopers.
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the most costly one in terms of compliance, introducing a minimum tax would
dramatically lower these costs. Moreover, it would be much easier for the RA to
administer the application of a minimum tax compared to book audits. Then,
a minimum tax would help the government recover uncollected revenues due to
the high level of tax evasion that characterizes Italy, and the cost as a result of
the change in concentration would be tolerable.
Considering that each single audit costs to RA e1,925 (see Mazzolini (2017)),
the implementation of a minimum tax in a context of limited reactions requires
just an investment of e12,849,375 in the context of the Istat methodology and of
e13,240,150 in the context of RA to audit all the taxpayers in group 4. Since the
implementation of a minimum tax will cause a predicted increase of the collected
taxes equal to e32,072,869 with the Istat methodology and to e18,212,188 with
the RA one. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the resources
invested by RA to audit G1 to make a comparison.
However, it is not guaranteed that taxpayers’ reactions would be limited. If
Italian taxpayers have a small reaction, introducing a minimum tax is a viable
policy to solve the problems reported above (high levels of evasion, high compli-
ance costs, costly audits given the RA’s resources), but high levels of reaction
would worsen the initial situation. As shown above, if the government introduces
a minimum tax in a context of moderate reactions, the outcome is not desirable
since it would bring lower revenues and changes in concentration. Only in the
presence of limited reactions can the considerable decreases in compliance and
administrative costs justify the trade-off between revenues and concentration
changes that a minimum tax brings.
Future developments of this work might study different solutions to the
problem of the correct perception of presumptive taxes as minimum taxes. This
study measures reactions by σ and focuses on the effects of different levels of
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reactions. It will be interesting to analyze changes in the policy aiming to
influence reactions. A promising example is the possibility of considering the
implementation of credible audits on the taxpayers with T jD > T
j
P to enable
them to comply to the minimum tax policy. Moreover, it would be interesting
to endogenize the control costs to investigate the possibility of limiting the
levelling effect.
Further, it will be possible to investigate various solutions to limit the leaving
effect. One solution could be to introduce a progressive minimum tax to avoid
taxpayers leaving the market. Another possibility would be to investigate other
proxies of their tax base or the possibility of finding other assets to tax. Finally,
it would also be possible to analyze a taxpayer subsidy to help them to stay in
the market. In this case, it is only necessary to provide with adequate resources
to reach the threshold level at which they are indifferent between staying in the
market or leaving it.
Appendix 2.A Groups classification
The new methodology developed by the Italian Statistical Institution (Istat)
in 2014 6 is characterized by an increase in the number of economic subjects
analyzed and in the precision and conceptual distinction between the phase of
finding the underreporting subjects and revising the declared income.
The taxpayers included in the analysis are those with fewer than 100 workers7
and outside the agricultural or related sectors8. The observed subjects are
then analyzed separately in homogeneous groups. More specifically, using the
economic characteristics included in the Frame-Sbs database9, Istat divides the
6A.Puggioni et al. “L’Economia Non Osservata nei Conti Nazionali” (2015)
7This is the result of the data analyzed by Istat. Only information on firms with fewer
than 100 workers are collected by this institution for the Frame-Sbs database.
8It is worth recalling that incomes in these sectors are calculated on a forfeit base.
9Frame-Sbs is the database that Istat used in the work. In greater detail, it includes
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pool into the following macro-classes:
• Group 1: minimal dimension taxpayers;
• Group 2: micro units;
• Group 3: organized units;
• Group 4: national groups units; and,
• Group 5: taxpayers unable to be analyzed.
Group 1 includes mostly small entrepreneurs and professionals. This group
comprises taxpayers for which the work of the owner is similar to that of a
dependent worker. These taxpayers are characterized by very low capital. The
largest input into the production function is the personal work of the individual,
whereas using workers or fixed assets is viewed as an obstacle to freedom of
activity. The main characteristics are as follows:
• Not being a limited company or a being controlled by a limited company;
• Not being a non-working member of any firm;
• Adhering to the minimum tax scheme;
• Declaring total revenues less than e30,000;
• Having less than 1.5 independent workers hired but more than zero; and,
• Having virtually no dependent workers, at less than 0.5.
the most important economic information on all working entrepreneurs/firms (approximately
4.4 million units). The database does not include subjects engaging in agricultural or mining
activities. The information is from different administrative sources and is used in a hierarchical
manner. This new database was developed to increase the precision of the analysis by including
more sources of information, treating the sources in a different manner, and increasing the
number of populations/subpopulations (by dimension, activity sector, experience, and others).
It is worth noting that the core of the database is still represented by the Emens. Emens
are monthly declarations that employers must submit to report to INPS (the public Italian
insurance office), including full information on wages, working hours, and other items).
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Moreover, Group 1 is divided into three smaller groups. The first, G1A,
includes subjects in the condition of economic marginality and who have income
other than that recorded here. Possible examples include subjects earning a
pension and who nevertheless continue to work to increase their annual income.
Clearly, for these subjects, work generates a secondary income and, for this
reason, they should be analyzed separately. This sub-group includes subjects
older than 70 years (at this age, people are surely entitled to earn a social
pension from the Italian government) who are assumed to have insignificant
annuities.
The second sub-group, G1B, includes subjects considered to have low income-
earning ability. They work in fields requiring no particular skills or training and
that do not hire external workers. The entrepreneurs included in this sub-group
are aged between 30 and 70 years.
The third group, G1C, includes subjects working in activities characterized
by a high level of skills. This group includes subjects aged between 40 and 70
years and who work in the following sectors:
• business intermediation;
• software production;
• informatics consultancy;
• information technology services;
• auxiliary activity to the financial sector;
• insurance;
• real estate;
• scientific and technical professions;
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• business support activities; and,
• medical.
These subjects are differentiated from those included in G1B by the fact
that they use higher skills; however, their income is still earned mostly from
their work and their fixed assets are considered negligible.
Group 2 includes micro-entities characterized by proper organization and
structure, although small. The entrepreneur’s work is not the only main pro-
duction factor, and fixed assets are also used to produce the final product. The
characteristics of this group are similar to those of the previous group, apart
from the number of workers. Group 2 includes firms with 10 dependent workers
if their sector of activity is in industry, or six if they operate in services.
Group 3, organized units, includes firms with a higher number of employed
workers than the micro group, but that are still smaller than 100.
Group 4, national groups units, is similar to Group 3 and includes entities
with more than 10 dependent workers if their sector of activity is industry or six
if they operate in services. However, this group also encompasses firms linked
only to Italian firms. The main criteria used by Istat are as follows:
• No direct links with a foreign firm;
• No direct links with firms with more than 100 workers; and,
• No direct links with national groups owning a foreign firm.
Group 5 is more varied and includes several firms that must be removed
from the analysis for various reasons. As with Group 1, Group 5 is divided into
the following sub-groups. Group 5A includes firms assumed to be unaffected
by underreporting. Possible examples are firms owned by the state or public
administrations. Firms in particular sectors are also considered not affected
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by underreporting. Firms operating in extractions, mines, and sewers, among
others, given their characteristics, are normally considered to be compliant by
definition.
Group 5B comprises firms without data that can be trusted: firms with more
than 100 workers and firms with direct links to a foreign firm or national group
owning a foreign firm.
Group 5C includes firms in a particular period of their life (for example,
initial stages, transformation, bankruptcy). The main object of this enquiry
is to set up a method to compare firms in the context of perfect competition.
Including firms in such specific time periods means including entities that cannot
be compared with others. For this reason, excluding them from this analysis is
desirable.
The last group, Group 5D, includes firms that have particular character-
istics, such as cooperatives not pursuing the highest possible profit and firms
purchasing their own goods. These firms cannot be compared for the same
reasons as for those in Group 5C. Because the aim of the new methodology is
to compare homogeneous firms to detect underreporting ones, including these
firms alters the final outcome.
Provided this classification, it is clear why taxpayers included in groups G1A
and G5 are not used by Istat to estimate the hidden economy. The G1A group
represents taxpayers that can deliberately underreport, but their marginality
makes their inclusion not useful. All sub-groups included in G5 are taxpayers
that, for several reasons, are difficult to compare with other subjects. For this
reason, they should be excluded from the analysis.
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Appendix 2.B The two methodologies
2.B.1 General description
Different economic methodologies have been developed over time. This ap-
pendix illustrates some of the methodologies developed by two public Italian
institutions.
The methodology adopted by Istat to estimate the recent change in GDP.
This methodology has been declined considering the particular characteristics
of different subjects.
The estimation of the gross product calculated on all of the declarations
cannot be trusted because taxpayers’ incentives to underreport income are im-
portant. Because taxes are levied on declared income, a person can deliberately
report less revenues or higher costs to lower the taxes due. For this reason,
information on real income earned by taxpayers is difficult to obtain and adopt-
ing specific techniques is required. Istat has developed a methodology that aims
to calculate a threshold level— presumptive statistical income—for comparison
with declared income and for estimating the underreported amount.
At the same time, the methodology adopted by RA to develop the most
precise measure of presumptive income has changed. At the beginning of the
1970s, there was a radical transformation of Italian taxation. Following the
introduction of the value-added tax (VAT), a radically new approach to dealing
with taxpayers was developed because, for the first time, entrepreneurs and
professionals were treated at the same level as large firms. In 1982, for the first
time, it was possible to fine a subject on bases beyond analytic, in other words
on the validity of accounting books, but also on the bases of other elements.
In 1993, a new methodology based on the evaluation of the probability of a
taxpayer being not compliant was introduced. This assumption was based on a
comparison between presumptive and reported income. The instrument used to
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estimate presumptive income was called studi di settore (sds), which was used
for the first time in 1998 10.
The construction of sds has evolved over the years. After collecting various
information on internal variables (for example, costs, structure, productive pro-
cess) and external variables (for example, degree of market competition, prices)
of a selected sample of taxpayers, a cluster analysis of this information estimated
the presumptive income of each taxpayer by adopting multiple regression tech-
niques. It is important to stress that this procedure is not based on a sample
analysis; instead, each step includes constant research on the most sensitive
variables that influence the final result.
Although the final aims of Istat and RA are similar, they use different
methodologies and databases to estimate evaded income. The next section
provides a detailed illustration of the different methodologies.
2.B.2 Presumptive statistical income estimation for Group
G1B
Starting with G1B, the first task is to identify the subjects who underreport
their income. Because this group is characterized by significant use of personal
work and very few physical assets, the identification approach is largely based
on the assumption that an independent worker cannot declare less income than
a dependent one.
To begin, Istat stratifies its pool using the CART algorithm11 and four strat-
ification variables: economic sector, turnover, region, and legal form. The algo-
rithm constructs trees and nodes to divide the population. Each node includes
a pool of subjects with a specific combination of values in the stratification
10For further clarifications, it is possible to refers to Dal Prato (2016).
11The CART algorithm is characterized by the binary generation of regression trees. Some
observations in a dataset may be pruned to retain the most significant ones. This process is
done by considering the information gain produced by each observation.
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variables.
After this process is completed, the threshold income is evaluated by consid-
ering the wage of a dependent worker in each node. This methodology is similar
to that which gained scientific acceptance from Franz (1985). In this context,
it is possible to see that the core of the methodology is the comparison between
the declared income of a taxpayer in G1B and the income of a hired taxpayer
in the same occupation.
This process is undertaken in a normalized and non-normalized manner con-
sidering the differences among the full-time workers hired (managers, clerks, and
workers). The aim of this procedure is to obtain two different estimations of
the presumptive statistical income:
• Maximum value between an employee’s average income for the normalized
cost between two distinct working profiles (managers and clerks on one side
and workers on the other side); and
• Maximum value between an employee’s average income for the non-normalized
cost between two distinct working profiles (managers and clerks on one side
and workers on the other side).
As previously stated, the starting assumption is that the income of an en-
trepreneur that is smaller than the correspondent one of a dependent worker is
a hint that they are underreporting their income. In detail, the presumptive
statistical income is estimated by considering the highest income earned by a de-
pendent worker in each node. This comparison is made considering normalized
and non-normalized incomes.
It is worth noting that the comparison of incomes is made using income
before taxes. In the Italian context, this quantity is income before the IRAP
tax12, because this is the closest reported value that is representative of the cost
12IRAP is a tax levied on economic activities and redistributed in the region of the en-
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of a dependent worker.
trepreneur/firm. This tax was established in 1997 and is the only tax directly proportional to
turnover and not to annual profit.
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2.B.3 Presumptive statistical income estimation for Group
G1C
The approach applied to analyze entities included in G1C is quite different.
Although the same stratification technique is applied, the higher level of labor
skills that characterize this group make it difficult to perform an identification
strategy such as that for G1B. The identification strategy is a mark-up one:
the aim is to build a profit function that—considering different factors—can
evaluate the threshold income for each node.
Istat stratifies its pool using only two parameters (i = sector of activity
and region). The model is estimated for subjects that can be considered to be
unaffected by underreporting because they have income (again, income before
the IRAP tax) at least equal to the labor cost of the node.
For every node of the stratified pool “m,” it is possible to represent the
relationship between the entrepreneur’s profit Rm*, intermediate costs Intm,
and cluster Clum. At the same time, it is possible to define the following
multivariate linear model with dimensional effects (classes of employees), sectors
(groups of economic activities), and a regional dummy Dk,m,i. The function is
as follows:
Rm*= α + µ’Intm +βClum+
∑
Zxy∈ ~k,d dk,d Dk,d,m + m
The previous function states that revenue Rm* is a function of a constant α,
inputs for a single independent worker, the threshold parameter of each node,
and dummies that refer to the context and error term m. In the function,
the term Intm refers to the inputs of intermediate consumption per employee,
which represents the coefficient of the mark-up. In detail, it represents the
intermediate cost per independent worker. The term Clum represents a value
peculiar to each node of the strata. This term is the cost of a dependent worker.
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For this reason, it is assumed that an entrepreneur should earn at least as
much as a dependent worker engaged in the same duties. Finally, there are six
dummies, each distributed on a scale of five. The dummies d are the Herfindal
concentration index, capital intensity use, demography, level of non-compliance,
variation in the workforce, and geography (Italy has been divided into four
macro areas: North West, North East, Center, and South). The dummies have
a very important role in this relationship because they limit the hypothesis of
strong linearity, control a large part of the heterogeneity attributable to different
behaviors, and provide a more precise and accurate estimation given the values
linked to the context of each entrepreneur.
113
114
As previously noted, once the underreporting subjects are identified, it is
possible to correct the income. The correction procedure aims to substitute the
income of non-compliant entrepreneurs with the presumptive income that has
been evaluated for each node.
2.B.4 Italian Revenue Agency approach: Presumptive op-
erative income
Starting from 1998, the RA has adopted a methodology to estimate the pre-
sumptive income of firms, entrepreneurs, and professionals that is referred to
here as operational (to distinguish it from the Istat or statistical methodolo-
gies). Since then, different adaptations have occurred from the initial setting;
however, the general layout of this instrument has not changed.
The instrument chosen to estimate presumptive income in Italy is the sds.
This instrument aims to estimate the presumptive operative income of firms and
professionals earning less than e7,500,000 through a step-by-step procedure that
is summarized as follows:
• Identification of activities to study and relative variables by sending spe-
cific questionnaires to taxpayers;
• Analysis of the replies and removal of those considered abnormal;
• Identification of homogeneous clusters;
• Estimation of an income function for each cluster using the variables col-
lected;
• Territorial analysis of taxpayers; and,
• Attribution of the appropriate cluster to all taxpayers.
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The variables used to construct a cluster are structural (for example, number
of employees, size of offices or warehouses), accounting (for example, costs of
inputs), and territorial (for example, degree of competition). A detailed descrip-
tion of sds is offered by Fiorio et al. (2013), and its adaptation is provided here.
RA’s main aim is to create C homogeneous differentiated clusters, where each
cluster c = {1, 2, ..., C} is constructed by observing the variables of the reliable
taxpayers Rc, where Rc ⊆ Ic, and Ic is a sub-group of the total population I
included in any cluster c, such that
⋃
Ic = I. RA estimates c relationships of
revenues y’ for each reliable firm in year t as follows:
yc,r,t= β
′
c,t xc,r,t + c,r,t
In the equation r ∈ 1, . . . , Rc, xc,r,t is the J × Rc matrix of inputs at time
t, y(c, r, t) is the value of the sales reported by a reliable firm in each cluster
at time t, and the last term is an error term. The aim is to estimate β′c,t, the
J × 1 vector of unknowns for each cluster c using multiple regression techniques
to bring it to βˆc,t. This is done because RA aims to estimate for year t the
J ×Rc vector of the productivity parameter coefficient: because this is done in
year t+3, we have b(c, t+ 3) = βˆc,t.
After this vector is estimated, the presumptive sales of each firm i of the
entire population of firms I still active in year t + 3 are evaluated as y¯c,i,t =
b′(c, t) xc,i,t, which can differ from the reported sales y(c, i, t). It should also
be mentioned that the true inputs (x˜c,i,t) and sales (y˜c,i,t) can differ from the
reported inputs (xc,i,t) and sales (yc,i,t).
Once the presumptive sales y¯c,i,t have been estimated for each unit, they
are then compared with the declared sales yc,i,t. If the presumptive sales are
lower than the declared sales (y¯c,i,t < yc,i,t), the taxpayer is labelled congruous,
to signal the positive return of this control. However, if presumptive sales are
lower than declared sales ( y¯c,i,t > yc,i,t), the unit is labelled incongruous and
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the difference between the two sales levels (considering that costs are the same)
is the hint of evasion. Being labelled incongruous has various disadvantages,
such as, for example, a higher probability of being audited and facing greater
difficulty receiving tax refunds.
2.B.5 Istat methodology: Results for G1B
The next step is to mimic Istat’s procedure to evaluate presumptive income. Be-
cause the database is quite different from the Istat database, some adaptations
are required.
The first difference concerns the stratification algorithm that has been used.
In this work, the sample has been stratified using the Chi-square Automatic
Interaction Detector (CHAID) stratification algorithm13 rather than the CART
algorithm. Moreover, there are fewer stratification variables than with Istat.
Without information from the legal form, the stratification is done using the
available information: economic sector, turnover, and region. It is worth noting
that all 434,011 taxpayers have been included in the stratification and that, in
the end, a total of 60 leaves were determined (see Appendix 2.B.2 for a more
detailed analysis of the database).
A second difference concerns the identification of the presumptive statistical
income in each stratum. The Istat methodology identifies presumptive statisti-
cal income as the highest income earned by a dependent worker in a stratum.
However, Istat data are first analyzed by comparing various sources and prun-
ing the inconsistent ones. In this manner, it is possible to investigate whether
13In contrast to Istat, the algorithm used in this analysis is CHAID). Unfortunately, it
was impossible to run the CART algorithm with the software used (Stata 13). Among the
other possible algorithms, CHAID was selected, which is similar to CART in that it assists in
finding relationships among observations and analyzes the data all-in-one rather than splitting
them into sub-groups and performing multiple tests. However, if CART generates a binary
regression tree, CHAID builds regression trees that are not limited by being binary and that
are characterized by checking whether the relationships among the variables are statistically
significant.
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extreme values are reasonable or are simply mistakes, allowing for corrections.
Data included in this database are considered crude because such activity is not
performed (the information that is reported in the fiscal forms); thus, inconsis-
tent values are not pruned because Istat does so. To overcome this problem,
instead of choosing the highest salary of a dependent worker as the presumptive
income in each node, the 9th decile salary is selected. This choice is a compro-
mise between the highest and the average such that it is still as close as possible
to Istat’s methodology.
Considering the previous flow chart for G1B, the stratification has been
done on 434,011 taxpayers over three stratification variables (economic sector,
turnover, and region). A total of 60 leaves were determined, no normalization
was done, and the 9th decile of the income of a dependent worker was identified
as the presumptive income.
Moreover, the database does not provide any information on the qualifica-
tions of the workforce: it is not possible to identify who is a manager or a clerk,
making it impossible to estimate the normalized and non-normalized incomes
of dependent workers. Identifying the presumptive income Rm is simply per-
formed on the declared cost of the dependent workers. After Rm is identified,
it is possible to compare the declared incomes to the presumptive income in
each node and substitute the declared income with the presumptive one if it is
smaller.
Table 2.10 shows the average incomes declared by G1B subjects in each
cluster, the average of the income of the dependent workers in that cluster, and
finally the average presumptive income in each cluster in 2007. It is important
to state that all incomes refer to all professional incomes that are in any case
referable to each unit. Possible revenues from owning land or earning rent for
buildings are not included if they are not related to the profession.
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Table 2.10: Calculation of average presumptive income and real income, year
2007 – Group G1B
Cluster n. Declared inc. Presumpt. inc. Av. correction Corrected inc.
1 1,745.00 10,588.29 22,134.00 13,949.79 24,538.08
2 5,769.00 13,421.74 25,211.80 12,319.96 25,741.70
3 4,130.00 12,187.64 21,240.57 9,867.66 22,055.30
4 2,362.00 11,666.56 13,118.00 3,120.68 14,787.24
5 2,872.00 14,897.83 13,123.00 1,690.70 16,588.52
6 2,890.00 17,096.92 13,444.00 1,355.15 18,452.07
7 911 18,277.29 13,918.00 1,587.85 19,865.14
Total 20,679.00 13,668.22 18,956.46 7,435.53 21,103.75
In Table 2.10, the presumptive income is the 9th decile of the highest in-
come earned by the dependent workers in each cluster. It is worth remembering
that presumptive statistical income is the threshold level that measures whether
or not an entrepreneur is supposed to be compliant. In detail, it is the mini-
mum level that an entrepreneur has to declare to be considered compliant. If
a unit of the dataset has declared income less than the presumptive income,
it is considered incompliant and a correction is required. The average of the
differences between the declared income and the presumptive income for each
class is reported in Table 2.10: it can be noticed that the average correction is
higher than the average declared income and that a large part of this correction
is concentrated in Clusters 2 and 3.
After the correction, the corrected income can be estimated. For each unit,
the maximum difference between the declared income and the presumptive in-
come is taken, and then the average is quantified for each cluster. As expected,
the corrected income is higher than the average declared income and the pre-
sumptive income, although the corrected income is quite close to the presump-
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tive income. Because the corrected income is the maximum between the declared
income and the presumptive income, it must be higher than both. However, for
the corrected income to be very close to the presumptive income and remark-
ably different from the declared income is a hint of low compliance among the
taxpayers.
Table 2.11: Estimation of average presumptive statistical income and real in-
come – Group G1B.
Year n. Decl. income Pres. Income Pres. correction Corrected inc.
2007 20,679 13,668 18,956 7,436 21,104
2009 21,881 13,756 20,272 8,628 22,384
2010 21,979 14,105 19,883 8,024 22,129
2011 21,895 14,806 20,816 8,221 23,026
It is possible to notice that the number of taxpayers differs for different years.
This happens because some subjects fulfil the requirements to be enlisted in G1B
in certain years but not in others. For example, in one year, they might employ
some workers and then be entitled to be part of G2. However, the results are
quite similar for all years investigated, and the conclusions drawn for 2007 can
also be extended to the other years.
2.B.6 Istat methodology: Results for G1C
Focusing on G1C, the procedure is different and follows what was previously
described, with some adaptations applied.
As reported in the previous section, the model developed by Istat is a mark-
up model. Instead of comparing declared income to a presumptive income es-
timated as for G1B, the methodology developed for G1C taxpayers focuses on
estimating a profit function for each cluster using the information for taxpayers
who are supposed to be compliant.
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As with G1B, the analysis of G1C started by a stratification of the sam-
ple. The CHAID 14 algorithm was used and, following Istat, the stratification
variables were geographical location and economic activity. This resulted in 28
clusters with 13 including G1C taxpayers. Because G1C was stratified by differ-
ent variables, the stratification is different from G1B, making the intermediate
results not directly comparable (comparing the first clusters in the different
stratifications is meaningless). Only the final results can be useful for inferences
among the two groups.
Rm*= α + µ’Intm +βClum+
∑
Zxy∈ ~k,d dk,d Dk,d,m + m
At each node level, the profits are estimated considering the intermediate
costs (int) of independent workers, a parameter peculiar to each node (Clu)
referring to the labor cost, and two dummies on five levels to limit the possibility
of strong linearity. Given this dataset, in this study it is possible to include the
dummies referred to as the Herfindal concentration index.
Moreover, to avoid collinearity, capital intensity (Cap) is not expressed as
a dummy. Unfortunately, demography, level of non-compliance, variation in
the workforce, and geography cannot be included in the analysis. The first
three cannot be included because of a lack of data and the fourth one because
of collinearity problems given that only three regions are represented in the
dataset.
Another difference is in the fact that the procedure does not consider the
maximum wage of the dependent worker of each node as a threshold level, in
contrast to the 9th decile of Istat and the analysis of G1B. The results are too
extreme if these values are used; in particular, too few subjects are compliant,
making it impossible for the analysis to continue.
14For the same reasons as previously noted, the CART algorithm was not used for G1B;
CHAID was used in the analysis of G1C.
121
Considering the previous flow chart for G1C, the stratification was done on
434,011 taxpayers over two stratification variables (economic sector and region).
A total of 28 leaves were determined, the profit function was estimated over
intermediate costs, labor costs, and two dummies (Herfindal concentration index
and capital intensity), and the 5th decile of the income of a dependent worker
was identified as presumptive income.
The result of the regression for 2007 is represented in the following table:
Table 2.12: Estimation of the parameters of the mark-up model, year 2007 –
Group G1C.
Coef. Std. Err. t P> |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Int 0.745679 0.119575 6.24 0 0.511145 0.980212
Clu 0.433694 0.304842 1.42 0.155 -0.16422 1.031608
Cap. intens.
Herfindal 4500.561 1978.361 2.27 0.023 620.2329 8380.89
.0000455- 19588.22 3720.462 5.26 0 12290.96 26885.48
.0000911- 10116.27 3850.007 2.63 0.009 2564.921 17667.62
.0001781-
0.284523 0.14491 1.96 0.05 0.000299 0.568747
cons 1741.004 4840.506 0.36 0.719 -7753.09 11235.1
The parameters are then used to estimate the presumptive income of each
cluster that includes G1C taxpayers. Once the parameters are evaluated, it is
possible to estimate the presumptive income for each cluster and evaluate the
difference from declared income.
Regarding G1B, it is possible to summarize the main results in a table. The
next table shows the average declared income, presumptive income, average
correction, and corrected income for each cluster.
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Table 2.13: Calculation of average presumptive income and real income, year
2007 – Group G1C
Year n. Decl. income Pres. Income Pres. correction Corrected inc.
3 466 16,320.48 24,179.87 10,515.94 26,836.42
4 170 17,495.17 29,086.98 13,533.23 31,028.39
6 633 13,778.61 22,472.14 9,178.94 22,957.55
9 130 15,328.17 34,011.94 19,367.06 34,695.23
10 48 12,597.54 31,241.82 18,644.28 31,241.82
11 5 11,035.20 54,578.65 43,543.45 54,578.65
14 456 28,981.34 52,471.32 28,681.09 57,662.44
18 48 12,365.63 27,436.86 15,294.16 27,659.78
21 348 14,377.59 24,807.55 10,624.85 25,002.44
23 73 14,359.82 24,890.12 11,818.82 26,178.64
24 74 13,369.46 29,782.40 16,652.02 30,021.48
25 11 10,713.36 41,457.69 30,744.32 41,457.69
27 277 24,261.14 36,564.81 18,366.47 42,627.61
Total 2,739 18,124.18 31,074.77 15,214.52 33,338.71
The average declared income appears higher in G1C relative to G1B. This
result was expected because taxpayers included in G1C are characterized by
a higher degree of specialization relative to G1B. The analysis shows that by
estimating presumptive income using Istat’s mark-up model, the average income
for this class is much higher than that of G1B. The presumptive income is
e31,074.77, whereas for G1B it was estimated at e18,956.46.
Given such a difference between declared income and presumptive income,
the average correction is very high—almost equal to declared income. At the
same time, the corrected income is very close to the presumptive income. The
results in the table show that the difference between the presumptive income
and the corrected income is less than e3,000. This difference indicates that
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most of the corrected income is the result of presumptive income, whereas the
influence of declared income is almost negligible.
It is also possible to compare the results for G1C for 2007 with those of the
other years, as provided in the following table in summary form:
Table 2.14: Estimation of average presumptive statistical income and real in-
come – Group G1C
Year n. Decl. income Pres. Income Pres. correction Corrected inc.
2007 2,739 18,124 31,075 15,215 33,339
2009 3,003 18,096 69,254 52,740 70,837
2010 3,145 18,684 54,203 37,879 56,563
2011 3,190 18,585 54,037 37,586 56,171
The comparison between estimations referring to G1C appear to be not as
consistent as those for G1B. This result can be explained by the difference in
the number of taxpayers involved in the estimation process. Provided that the
estimations in G1C are based on almost one-tenth of the sample, the overall
results are less accurate and more sensitive to the extreme results. Although
the difference between the corrected income and the declared income can be
observed to be significantly higher in all cases, a difference in magnitude exists
with this divergence.
2.B.7 Istat methodology: Overall analysis of G1 and val-
idation
Once G1B and G1C have been analyzed, it is possible to study Group 1 as a
whole. First, it should be remembered that G1A was not present in the previous
analysis because it was considered a group that was not evading. Because Group
G1A was considered an always-compliant group of subjects, it is also possible
to summarize the number of compliant and non-compliant taxpayers:
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Table 2.15: Distribution of compliant subjects among classes, year 2007.
Compliant Non-compl. Total
G1A 203 0 203
G1B 6,635 14,044 20,679
G1C 284 2,455 2,739
Total G1 7,122 16,499 23,621
30.15% 69.85%
It is possible to compare Istat’s actual predictions for 2010 and 2011. In
2010, Istat estimated that 77.7% of firms included in G1 were non-compliant,
whereas in 2011 the proportion was very similar, at 77.9%. The estimation
carried out on the sample brought a close result because the difference is less
than 10%, even if referring to a different year. In terms of a comparison with
other years, the following table reports the results, showing that they are similar
in all analyzed years.
To continue, it is possible to investigate the rate of correction by expressing
the ratio between declared income and the average correction reported for each
sub-group.
Table 2.17: Ratio of correction Group 1, year 2007.
Declared Corrected % ISTAT 2010 ISTAT 2011
G1A 2,796,809 2,796,809 /
G1B 282,645,197 436,404,510 154.40% 199.70% 163.90%
G1C 49,642,136 91,314,714 183.95% 241.00% 247.90%
Total G1 335,084,142 530,516,033 158.32% 178.50% 162.60%
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Table 2.16: Distribution of compliant subjects among classes in other years.
2009
Compliant Non-compl. Total
G1A 246 0 246
G1B 6,485 15,396 21,881
G1C 156 2,847 3,003
Total G1 6,887 18,243 25,130
27.41% 72.59%
2010
Compliant Non-compl. Total
G1A 298 0 298
G1B 6,959 15,020 21,979
G1C 227 2,918 3,145
Total G1 7,484 17,938 25,422
29.44% 70.56%
2011
Compliant Non-compl. Total
G1A 296 0 296
G1B 6,603 15,292 21,895
G1C 222 2,968 3,190
Total G1 7,121 18,260 25,381
28.06% 71.94%
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Table 2.18: Ratio of correction Group 1 in other years.
2009
Declared Corrected %
G1A 3,733,656 3,733,656 /
G1B 301,004,371 489,787,759 162.72
G1C 54,343,532 212,722,178 391.44
Total G1 359,081,559 706,243,593 196.68
2010
Declared Corrected %
G1A 4,304,293 4,304,293 /
G1B 310,015,329 486,372,970 156.89
G1C 58,761,854 177,889,892 302.73
Total G1 373,081,476 668,567,155 179.2
2011
Declared Corrected %
G1A 3,847,184 3,847,184 /
G1B 324,168,571 504,160,892 155.52
G1C 59,287,334 179,186,780 302.23
Total G1 387,303,089 687,194,856 177.43
In addition, for the correction ratio, the results estimated on the database
referring to 2007 are very close to those of Istat 15 ( 178.5% in 2010 and 162.6%
in 2011). The other years show similar results.
15Istat “Il nuovo approccio alla valutazione della Noe nei Conti Nazionali” (2015).
127
2.B.8 RA presumptive operational income
The methodology developed by RA is different from that of Istat because of
its particular mission. The main goal of RA is to find a precise estimation
of each taxpayer’s real income. The approach is completely different because,
here, the focus is each taxpayer’s income. Although Istat’s classification is still
used to assist when comparing the different estimations, the methodologies are
completely different, as previously illustrated.
The database for this study already labeled each taxpayer as congruous or
incongruous, and has the presumptive income for each subject. Without the
need to mimic the estimation procedure of the institution, it is possible to
analyze the pool of subjects while maintaining the groups previously identified
by Istat:
Table 2.19: Distribution of compliant subjects among classes, year 2007.
Congruous Incongruous Total
G1A 125 78 203
G1B 11,738 8,941 20,679
G1C 1,721 1,018 2,739
Total G1 13,584 10,037 23,621
57.51% 42.49%
The RA methodology was observed to make the number of compliant subjects—
the congruous ones—slightly higher than the non-compliant subjects—the in-
congruous ones. The RA methodology suggests a higher level of compliance,
and this higher level is equally present in all three classes in almost the same
proportions.
This initial representation helps show some differences between the Istat
and RA methodologies. First, group G1A is now not completely represented by
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compliant subjects. It is worth recalling that the Istat methodology suggests
that these subjects are already earning an income and a pension, and that other
jobs can be considered a simple integration of safe and regular earnings. Because
the revenues of another occupation are considered income from a secondary
partial job, they are not investigated further. However, the RA methodology,
which provides estimates of presumptive income for all taxpayers, also provides
an estimation for this group, and presumptive incomes are then included in this
analysis.
The predictions of the presumptive incomes of the investigated taxpayers
can be summarized considering the Istat classification already provided:
Table 2.20: Presumptive operational incomes across groups.
Declared Correction Presumptive
G1A 13,777 4,488 17,512
G1B 13,668 6,094 19,589
G1C 18,124 5,861 23,910
Total G1 14,186 6,053 20,072
In the previous table, the total for Group G1 represents the weighted means
of the declared and presumptive incomes of all subjects included in the sample
and the relative corrections. This information shows that the most numerous
group, G1B, is also the group characterized by the highest average correction.
Presenting this same information for the other periods is also possible. If
the proportion of subjects assumed to be non-compliant is investigated, approx-
imately 70% of taxpayers assumed to be congruous (10% more considering the
2007 results) given the RA predictions.
A review of the incomes shows that the results are very close to each other,
although the numbers change over the years. The same conclusions drawn for
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Table 2.21: Distribution of congruous subjects among years – RA methodology.
Year Congr. % Incongr. % Tot
2009 17,615 70.10% 7,515 29.90% 25,130
2010 17,268 67.93% 8,154 32.07% 25,422
2011 17,466 68.82% 7,915 31.18% 25,381
2007 can also be extended to the other years, including when the number of
taxpayers changes:
Table 2.22: Declared income, correction, and presumptive income across years,
RA methodology.
Year n. Declared Correction Presumptive
2007 23,621 14,186 6,053 20,072
2009 25,130 14,289 5,994 20,201
2010 25,422 14,676 4,519 19,052
2011 25,381 15,260 4,078 19,194
Compared with the Istat results, the values between the observed years are
more similar. The correction ratio for the other years shows lower values for all
years relative to the Istat years. Moreover, they are consistent for each year,
and variations among the years are quite limited.
Table 2.23: Ratio of correction Group 1, RA methodology.
Year Declared Corrected %
2009 359,081,559 507,661,835 141.38%
2010 373,081,476 484,345,553 129.82%
2011 387,303,089 487,154,145 125.78%
2.B.9 Comparison of methodologies
In the previous part, two different methodologies were illustrated and estima-
tions were made on a specific database to show the different predictions by
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these methodologies. This section investigates in greater detail the differences
and examines the benefits and challenges of the possible effects of presumptive
taxation.
As explained, the methodologies developed by Istat and RA are differenti-
ated provided the diversities in the data and the intention of their investigations.
Although the main goal is to provide the most correct estimation possible of
real incomes, the results can be quite different.
The different methodologies can be compared by comparing the Istat and
RA predictions. As previously noted, the analysis is for 2007, and investigations
will determine whether the same results are replicated in other years.
Table 2.24: Distribution of subjects among classes.
ISTAT RA ISTAT RA
Compl. Congr Not Congr Non-compl. Congr Not Congr
G1A 125 125 78
G1B 6,635 4,636 1,999 14,044 7,102 6,942
G1C 284 236 48 2,455 1,485 970
Σ G1 7,044 4,997 2,125 16,499 8,587 7,912
70.94% 30.17% 52.05% 47.95%
The two methodologies appear to be quite different in their predictions.
The differences can be analyzed group by group. The initial Istat assumptions
about G1A appear not to hold when the RA methodology is applied. If the
RA methodology is implemented, only 40% of the sample is not congruous and,
thus, is suspected of being characterized by tax evasion.
The analysis of Group G1B also shows that the Istat and RA predictions
are inconsistent with each other. The prediction of compliancy and congruity
are inconsistent; moreover, congruous taxpayers appear to be higher in number
than incongruous taxpayers when Istat predicts non-compliance. The higher
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proportion of congruous taxpayers relative to non-congruous taxpayers is only
said to prevail when Istat predicts the subject to be compliant.
Finally, the same conclusions drawn for G1B are confirmed for G1C. The
Istat predictions are inconsistent with the RA predictions, although congruence
between the proportion of congruous and non-congruous taxpayers for this group
appears to occur when Istat predicts that the subjects are compliant.
If the same analysis is performed on the other periods, the results are quite
similar to the results of previous periods.
Table 2.25: Distribution of subjects among different classes in different years.
ISTAT RA ISTAT RA
Year Compl. Congr Not Congr Not compl. Congr Not Congr
2009 6,827 5,230 1,657 18,243 12,385 5,858
76.61% 24.27% 67.89% 32.11%
2010 7,484 5,879 1,605 17,938 11,389 6,549
78.55% 21.45% 63.49% 36.51%
2011 7,121 5,651 1,470 18,260 11,815 6,445
79.36% 20.64% 64.70% 35.30%
Compared with 2007, the results for the other periods appear consistent.
When Istat predicts that a subject is compliant, the RA methodology predic-
tion is that approximately two out of ten subjects are compliant. However,
when Istat predicts non-compliance, the results are less consistent because six
out of ten taxpayers are now supposed to be compliant according to the RA
methodology.
In summary, both methodologies predict low tax compliance, with Istat pre-
dicting higher tax evasion. Interestingly, the methodologies’ predictions are
quite different in their identification of taxpayers as compliant or not compli-
ant. This diversity can be justified by the differences in the methodologies that
were previously illustrated, such as different starting assumptions and identifi-
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cation strategies.
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